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Money laundering is a persistent threat to the economic viability of every nation.    
However the intent behind this behaviour does not always converge with the 
criminality of the act.  A study of 395 international university students in Australia 
demonstrated a prominent cultural and regional norm in South Asia to use 
untraceable ‘informal’ remittance systems.  Under Australian legislation, the use of a 
non-compliant alternative or informal value transfer system (IVTS) is an act that 
predicates the laundering of money regardless of intent.  Yet in line with a clear 
cultural proclivity and trust in money transfer businesses, it is evident that many 
ordinary people still use these systems everyday alongside criminals and terrorists.  
The data in this study highlights a trend of willingness in remittance staff to accept 
student identification as valid identification for an international money transfer.  The 
international anti-money laundering regime is a broad-scope, top-down system, 
which recommends a standard format of anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regulation for all at-risk sectors of a national 
economy.  However, the abuse of globally recognised monetary transfer systems is 
symptomatic of the flaws in this broad approach.  Australia’s Financial Intelligence 
Unit AUSTRAC has recognised the need for less restrictive regulation of alternative 
remittance business.  Despite this fact, the regulation of the Australian alternative 
remittance sector has failed to account for the environmental, cultural, and informal 
heritage impact factors in this process, which has reduced the efficacy of Australia’s 
AML/CTF programme.  A second data set suggests that regulatory inadequacies 
extend beyond the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send 
untraceable money to and from Australia uninhibited.  The findings of this research 
conclude that there are eight barriers which inhibit AML/CTF compliance in 
alternative remittance businesses.  These barriers range from cultural, 
environmental, and trust based networks, to commercial and regulatory opportunism.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory nature of society and the reality of ruling decree is a direct 
product of experience, and for most people a desire to create order out of chaos. 
Through this direction a level of order has been reached by implementing systems of 
good governance.  Despite this, the control over free trade is only limited. Legitimate 
trade carries with it the burden of illegal and poorly regulated transactions. This 
damage manifests in every nation to varying degrees.  Some of this harm is the 
product of the sale of illicit substances and weapons, human trafficking, sex slavery, 
corruption, and violent conflict (APG, 2011; Moore, 2001; Sullivan & Smith, 2012).  
Pervasive illegal activities embody the dark side of the global economy, which 
together earn approximately US$870 billion annually (UNDOC, 2012). The sinister 
side of the international economy is indicative of an ongoing need for collaborative 
thinking and cross-cultural problem solving to reduce or, if possible, remove the 
opportunity to exploit economic systems.  This work provides a partial view of the 
key issues within one area of the global economy, Alternative Remittance Systems 
(ARS).  
The effort to combat money laundering internationally is in part a cooperative 
endeavour to establish good governance. According to the United Nations (2012), a 
standard of governance is judged on the transparency of its institutions. Good 
governance is not a specific set of goals, instead it is any system of government that 
promotes “...equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule 
of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring” (ibid).  Typical 
characteristics of poor governance are a lack of effectiveness, illogical management, 
tyranny, and a lack of accountability (Moore, 2001).  Systems of governance can be 
poor despite a nation’s attempt to improve transparency. Extreme poverty is linked 
with poor human resources management infrastructure and underfunded public 
institutions (Sachs & MacArthur, 2005).  However, cases of poor governance exist 
regardless of geography. In the context of anti-money laundering (AML), the 
improvement of governance directly impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of 
legislative regulatory action (Smith, 2011).  
Prior to the global acceptance of robust regulatory governance, trade 
occurred as a response to demand regardless of local or regional law. The history of 
trans-oceanic trade is instructive. In the late 1600’s transatlantic slave trading was a 
key source of income for pirates and the English East India Trading Company (EITC) 
(Platt, 1969 p.549).  During this period unlicensed colonial slavers (i.e. pirates) 
purchased Madagascan slaves and sold them at neutral ports without royal consent, 
(at the time) held exclusively by the EITC (ibid).  This example highlights two key 
features that can still be identified from a contemporary perspective.  Firstly the 
tendency for the trade market to meet demand regardless of the harm to society, and 
secondly the propensity for traders to seek out and exploit weaknesses in economic 
regulatory systems.  Today these traits have manifested the many shadowy facets of 
the world market which are the life blood of organised criminals and terrorists (Cook 
& Smith, 2011; UNDOC, 2012; Findlay, 2008; Ridley, 2008; Irwin, Choo, & Liu, 
2012). 
Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) are a product of innovation and 
adaptation. These systems have been the primary means of remittance over long 
distances for centuries (Passas, 1999; Razavy, 2005).  The most widely utilised 
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systems are ‘Hundi’, (from the Sanskrit meaning ‘to collect’), and ‘Hawala’ (from the 
Arabic which translates as ‘transform or change, or trust’).  Others include the 
Chinese ‘Flying Money’ and Colombian ‘Black Market Peso’ systems (Passas, 1999; 
Perkel, 2004). After September 11 2001, the Hawala process became infamous after 
it was identified as one of the systems used to fund the attacks on the World Trade 
Centres (NCTAUS, 2004).  Adding further to the notoriety of the Arabic system, the 
US Government had the Somali al-Barakaat IVTS shut down in the aftermath of the 
attacks (Passas, 2006; Cook & Smith, 2010).  The reputation associated with 
Hawala labelling it a system that directly funds terrorism has masked the reality of its 
use.  While Hawala and other IVTS have been used for illegitimate purposes, the 
majority of transfers made are legally sourced and have a legitimate receiver (Cook 
& Smith, 2011 a; Hammond, 2011; Razavy, 2005). 
Figure 1. Common Terms: Informal Transfer Systems 
Remittance and Value 
Transfer Terms Descriptive Notes 
Alternative Remittance 
Service (ARS) 
As cited by the Financial Action Task Force. 
Any form of ‘remittance system’ that is an 
‘alternative’ to formal systems (FATF, 2005). 
Informal Funds Transfer 
(IFT) 
International Monetary Fund IMF/World Bank 
(2003; Razavy, 2005).  
Used to describe any ‘Hawala’ style transfer that is 
likely not illegal (Passas, 2003; Passas, 2006). 
Informal Value Transfer 
System (IVTS) 
Widely cited academic term. 
Any alternative transfer system dealing in the 
transfer of ‘value’ or ‘funds’ (Passas, 1999; Irwin et 
al., 2012). 
Underground or Parallel 
Banking 
Negative terms based on the traditional, 
anonymous, and record free operation of 'Hawala' 
like systems. Implying they are shady criminal 
businesses (Razavy, 2005; Borgers, 2009). 
Informal Value Transfer 
Mechanism/Method 
(IFTM) 
Used to describe processes by which value is 
transferred, which are often illegal (Passas, 2003; 
Passas, 2006; Rees, 2010) 
 
Figure one displays five terms used to describe transfer systems.  Two of the 
three most commonly cited terms have been also been adopted by prominent 
international organisations, ARS by the FATF (FATF-GAFI, 2005), and Informal 
Funds Transfer by the IMF and World Bank (2003). While IVTS is widely cited in the 
literature there is some debate as to which of the terms are most accurate to 
describe the many faces of informal money transfer systems (Bunt, 2008; Passas, 
2006; Perkel, 2004; Rees, 2011). The use of the terms ‘underground’ and ‘parallel 
banking’, often used together, are pejorative terms and appear to be a product of the 
notoriety associated with the aftermath of the September 11 World Trade Centre 
attacks (Cook & Smith,2010; Razavy, 2005; Borgers, 2009).  Nikos Passas (1999; 
2003; 2006), introduces the term Informal Value Transfer Mechanism as a descriptor 
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for labelling mechanisms of value transfer.  He also states that should an Informal 
Value Transfer Mechanism be found it will likely involve criminal activity, due to the 
changing nature of the source of value from sender to receiver.  Passas also states 
that it is unlikely an Informal Funds Transfer (IFT) would involve any illicit actions as 
part of its normal process (ibid).  The general definition of an IFT does not exclude 
value transfers (Bank & World, 2003; Razavy, 2005).  
There is no consensus on a definitive title for the various facets of 
remittance/value transfer methods.  However for the purpose of this research, the 
term Alternative Remittance System, or ARS, will be used to describe a money or 
value transfer service in the broadest sense (FATF-GAFI, 2010).  The FATF (ibid), 
states that the definition of a money or value transfer service is as follows; 
A money or value transfer service refers to a financial service that accepts 
cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value in one 
location and pays a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary 
in another location by means of a communication, message, transfer or 
through a clearing network to which the money/value transfer service belongs.  
Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more 
intermediaries and a third party final payment. (p.13)   
The above definition was outlined in the IXth Special Recommendations report, 
published by the FATF, under Special Recommendation VI Alternative Remittance 
Service (FATF-GAFI, 2010).  This term suits this research project because it is 
applicable to all forms of informal money transfer.  Under the FATF recommendation 
an ARS business may be run legitimately as long as it is licensed or registered to 
comply with all relevant recommendations, and is subject to sanctions if it fails to 
comply (FATF-GAFI, 2010 p.13-14). 
Based on FATF guidelines, it is clear that Alternative Remittance Systems 
should retain their rightful place in the global economy and Australia. However the 
identification of multiple non-compliant remittance businesses in this research 
warrants deeper analysis to identify the extent of the threat to Australia’s national 
security.  Therefore a purpose of this thesis is to identify and describe the key issues 
that embody the weak points in international and Australian AML/CTF arrangements, 
and draw on and discuss data that highlight low levels of legislative adherence in 
certain ARS agencies. This thesis interrogates data collected from ARS service 
providers in Australia. 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 This study’s focus on adherence is a result of a widespread trend of 
exploitation in alternative remittance systems.  The informal nature of alternative 
remittance agencies has been exploited repeatedly to launder money (Kochan, 2005 
p.228; Rees, 2010 p.51-58).  Despite the number of international reports supporting 
this fact, the Australian Transaction and Records Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) have 
stated that their main focus in this context is Western Union and Australia Post 
because they conduct the majority of relevant transactions (Rees, 2010 p.58).  Data 
collected from fifty remittance businesses in Australia shows that the efficacy of 
regulation in the ARS sector needs re-evaluation, with scheduled re-assessment. 
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It is estimated that hundreds of billions in funds are laundered every year 
through systems that fail to keep appropriate records of their transactions 
(Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002; Rees, 2010). A system that transfers value in an 
informal manner is also known as an Informal Value Transfer System (Napoleoni, 
2004; Passas, 1999; 2003; 2006).  These systems were developed in order to allow 
safe movement of wealth through high risk areas. Another was to enable a shorter 
period of transfer time between provinces, allowing travellers to access funds at their 
destination (ibid). The modern financial spectrum of systems that are exploited to 
launder money exist in three forms; formal, alternative, and informal, with the latter 
two systems at greatest risk of abuse.  The formal sector includes many varieties of 
financially vectored businesses which include banks, insurance companies, and 
investment firms (Brown, 2009; Reuter & Truman, 2004).  These businesses have 
the strictest regulatory control imposed upon them because they move the most 
significant amount of funds.  Businesses in the formal financial sector are also more 
suited to strict regulatory control as a result of the formal nature of their everyday 
operation (Brown, 2009). 
The global ubiquity of alternative remittance systems is linked to a number of 
factors, primarily stemming from a heavy reliance on informal value transfer systems 
in developing countries.  Nations in Africa, Asia, and throughout the Middle East, rely 
almost completely on ‘informal’ or, in a Western context, ‘alternative’ systems of 
remittance (Passas, 1999).  These value transfer systems used by developing 
countries, (such as Hawala and Hundi), have been operating for over 100 years prior 
to the existence of the first formal banking systems (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002; 
Passas, 2003).  Moreover these systems are trusted over and above formal systems 
because developing countries are unstable, prone to conflict, and usually rife with 
corruption (Cook & Smith, 2011 a; Maimbo, 2003 p.37; Rees, 2010 p.15).  IVTS and 
ARS systems allow developing, conflict ridden, and economically unstable countries 
to gain access to much needed funds when formal systems have failed (Maimbo, 
2003; Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Rees, 2010; Razavy 2005).   
People in developing countries are more distrustful of Banks than people in 
developed nations. Citizens in South Asia, South-East Asia, and the Middle East are 
culturally and pragmatically more aligned with regional and local money agents than 
with name-brand financial institutions such as transnational banking corporations.   
Instead the people of Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Africa 
are more likely to put faith in their local informal money agent. The strength and 
acceptance of this confidence and trust is in spite of the poor record keeping and 
lack of shop front or branding intrinsic to ARS (Maimbo, 2003; Razavy, 2005; Cook & 
Smith, 2011 a).  Therefore to compare the economic regulatory power of a 
transnational corporate bank with its counterpart in the developed world, is to at least 
partly acknowledge a blind assumption of trust based on brand and marketing. 
Actions of this kind contradict the fundamental cultural norm of familial reliance on 
local, regional and well-known money traders.  Informal money agents carry 
significant stature in developing regions, and should be viewed in this light (Bowers, 
2009; Cook & Smith, 2011).  Apart from the culture, tradition, and familial trust 
associated with ARS agencies, informal money transfers provide an inexpensive and 
anonymous service unavailable through any formal financial system (Masciandaro et 
al., 2007 p.198-199).   
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There are familial and cultural reasons behind the popularity of ARS globally.  
Huntington (1997) states that as civilisations grow, the populace of every country will 
spread to the point where culture, traditions, and social norms will clash and result in 
conflict.  This hypothesis is reflected in the globalisation of economies. Migrants from 
less developed nations seek the prosperity and stability of other countries. As they 
repatriate money to family members in other countries, a significant transfer of funds 
takes place into regions which are often unstable and have low levels of economic 
security.  The informal nature of traditional ARS clashes with the highly formalised 
financial systems embedded in first world economies (Huntington, 1997; Bunt, 2008; 
Hammond, 2011).  These formalised systems ensure a steady flow of revenue back 
into each economy, in turn funding public sector maintenance and the expansion of 
health systems, public roads and transport (Huntington, 1997).  Huntington’s ‘Clash’ 
theory highlights the cultural and legal difficulties associated with extended 
population growth and expansion.  In the context of this research these issues may 
amplify the cost of effective regulation, and likely increase the risk of money 
laundering and terrorist financing through ARS as ethnic populations increase. 
After September 11 2001, many significant improvements within international 
economic systems were made. This was largely due to the international Anti Money 
Laundering (AML) community headed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF-
GAFI, 2012 b; Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.81-85). However with an ever growing list of 
money laundering incidents linked to the exploitation of alternative and informal 
systems, it is clear that more needs to be done to prevent money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism (Bunt, 2008, Kochan, 2005 p.212-235, Rees, 2010 p.50-83). 
A key barrier for law enforcement attempting to crack down on criminal 
organisations and terrorist networks is a lack of cross-jurisdictional consistency in 
AML/CTF legislation (Ridley, 2008; Levi & Reuter, 2006).  The PATRIOT Act, 
introduced in October 2001, is the pioneer of a wide-reaching and culturally-
unsettling trend in the global geopolitical context of AML/CTF legislation.  According 
to Reuter and Truman (2004 p.45-77), the Act is not hindered by legal 
inconsistencies across international borders.  Specifically the act allows the US to 
enter other countries and forcibly extradite, then prosecute anyone who is 
reasonably suspected of committing an act that predicates or facilitates money 
laundering.  The Patriot Act is the most recognised AML/CTF legislation in the world.  
The Act allows federal authorities to disregard state sovereignty in order to enforce 
domestic United States law (ibid).   
Money laundering is also closely associated with tax evasion, the punishment 
for which is also inhibited by an inability for law enforcement to cross international 
borders (Levi & Reuter, 2006; Irwin, Choo, & Liu, 2004).  The PATRIOT Act has also 
been designed to empower the US government to crack down on international tax 
evasion.  This action was impossible under previous anti-money laundering 
legislation.  The global regulatory thinking here is for the US and other sovereign 
nations to co-operate in an effort to improve the resilience of tax law internationally 
(Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.66).  Used to its fullest extent, the PATRIOT Act can 
impact on economic security and stability greater than any other affirmative action on 
breaches in tax law. 
Within the Australian context, AML/CTF legislation is focussed on the 
protection of Australian citizens against terrorism (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2011).  
Whilst there are many other issues surrounding the global effort to combat money 
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laundering, the Australian anti-money laundering regulations indicate the value of 
examining global remittance issues within the Australian financial sector.  Australian 
anti-money laundering regulatory administration is carried out by the Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Australia’s primary financial 
intelligence unit (FIU).  This transactional oversight is carried out under the AML/CTF 
Act of 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2012).  AUSTRAC is empowered to 
investigate any suspected breaches of Australian law with regard to the AML/CTF 
Act, with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as the primary law enforcement body 
(AUSTRAC, 2010).   
After the enactment of the AML/CTF Act in 2006, AUSTRAC introduced a 
‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) policy in order to combat the threat of money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  The guideline is applicable to all designated 
service providers entitled Regulated Entities in Australia.  Know Your Customer is a 
policy framework designed to provide a ‘watching brief’ over individual customers by 
examining the means and capabilities of each remitting customer on the basis of first 
hand and ‘at face value’ information. The application of KYC policy is designed to 
reduce the risk of money laundering and terror financing by ensuring that Regulated 
Entities actively look for, and report, all suspicious transactions.  In addition the 
Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988 legislates the mandatory reporting of 
significant cash transfers. This requires a higher level of identification from 
customers sending more than AUD$10,000.  The Act also includes requisite 
reporting requirements for wire transfers (IFTI’s), and suspicious transaction reports 
(SUSTR’s) (AUSTRAC, 2007; Australia, 2011). 
In Australia alternative remittance agencies have been deemed as high risk 
targets for exploitation (AUSTRAC, 2011 g). However designated remittance service 
providers are still only required to sight one form of primary photo identification for 
transfers below AUD $10,000 (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).  Primary photo identification 
means a government issued license, permit, or passport (National, Commonwealth, 
Foreign, or U.N).  Including state, territory, or foreign government issued proof of age 
cards that have a photo and signature of its owner (ibid).  This definition does not 
include student identification cards regardless of any similarities held with primary 
photo identification.  For the purpose of this research the term ‘government issued 
identification’ will refer to ‘primary photo identification’ as defined under the AML/CTF 
Act 2006 (Government, 2007).   
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This research is significant because it addresses the issue of whether the 
internationally recommended approach to regulating alternative remittance industries 
is a valid one. Furthermore this research may inform the need for AUSTRAC to alter 
its approach to regulation in the ARS sector by; 
a) Revisiting the structure of remittance regulation.  
b) Addressing the lack of training and educational resources available to 
non-finance based Regulated Entities.  
c) Address the lack of representation by a Peak Body in Australia’s ARS 
industry. 
d) Recognising the need to treat non-core remittance businesses 
differently to those in which finance is the core function.  
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If these issues are not addressed then the persistence of high risk unregulated 
remittance activity will continue to rise, along with the trend of criminal exploitation in 
Australia’s ARS sector. 
 This thesis is also significant for individuals, especially from ethnic 
communities, who regularly make informal remittance through at-risk (i.e. non-
compliant) ARS agencies.  This holds greater significance in this context because 
these people may be performing an every-day remittance activity which puts them at 
risk of prosecution, detention, or being marked as a red flag linked to illegal or 
unethical financial acts. 
The study of informal transfer systems holds international significance 
because it provides an understanding of regulatory issues pertaining to the 
prevalence of alternative remittance sectors globally. This study highlights a paucity 
of published research which validates the effectiveness of Australia's AML/CTF 
regulation of the ARS sector, which is derived from international recommendations 
on anti-money laundering. This study uses a small sample to gauge the state of 
legislative adherence in alternative remittance businesses which highlights the need 
for further research in this area.  By measuring regulatory discretion in alternative 
remittance, this study has put Australia's AML/CTF authorities in an informed 
position so as to meet challenges facing the international community in this area.   
This study is highly significant because it has helped identify businesses and 
individuals who launder money.  The research throws up new recommendations that 
reduce legislative breaches under the AML/CTF Act of 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007; 
Australia, 2012). Elements of the business community that have engaged specifically 
in exploiting ARS have been further exposed. This study simultaneously underlines 
the progress of AML/CTF regulations, and the capacity of measures intended to deal 
with incidents of money laundering in Australia. This research is also significant 
because it can be applied against domestic efforts to combat AML/CTF in other 
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the US, and India. 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Australia's AML/CTF legislation does not provide for regular public review of 
its effectiveness on any level, nor does it allow for progression in terms of threat 
analysis or any significant community input.  There is however, peer review and 
formal review through the FATF, however these reviews are carried out at very 
extended intervals. The first and last mutual evaluation of Australia’s AML/CTF 
regime was in 2005 and lacked community input (FATF-GAFI, 2005 a; 2005 b). 
Without timely review and a ‘peoples’ perspective on the efficacy of legislative 
application across financial sectors, remittance legislation is subject to continued 
regulatory defiance by ordinary citizens. Whilst it is important that remittance agents 
comply with their regulatory obligations, it is also important that ARS patrons receive 
acknowledgement of transnational remittance diversity.  Overall the anti-money 
laundering effort in Australia does not appear to support legislative adherence in 
ARS agents because there is an issue of scale. Large value transactions come 
under closer scrutiny than small-value multiple iterations. Small Value Transactions 
therefore easily fit into the standard format for most laundering transactions. Since 
they are not easily detected, these transactions pose a greater threat than larger 
transactions which encounter more deliberate and obvious scrutiny. Layering, 
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placement and integration remain the three main stages in standard money 
laundering techniques (Choo, 2008 p.3; Irwin et al., 2012).  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.4.1 Principal Question: 
To what extent are alternative remittance agencies upholding customer 
identification standards when transferring and receiving funds? 
This question is drawn from a need to understand the state of adherence to 
regulatory identification standards in alternative remittance agencies.  For example if 
an agent fails to identify their customer then the entire system built to manage the 
risks of money laundering and terrorism financing have failed.  In order to ensure 
that Australia enjoys reduced risk from incidents of terrorism, and organised crime is 
not given free reign, the AML/CTF legislation and associated regulations must be 
upheld. 
1.4.2 Supporting Question:  
What are the significant barriers to legislative adherence in ARS? 
Prior to the drive to step up regulatory control after September 11, some ARS 
systems operated without account, transaction records, and the need to implement 
KYC policy. Furthermore, the current regulation of the Australian ARS industry does 
not appear to ensure an appropriate level of knowledge or understanding, regarding 
the need for an effective and progressive risk management plan.  If ARS agents are 
not adhering to legislated AML/CTF regulations then the influence of their past 
informal behaviour may be a factor of influence in dis-incentivising others to comply 
with anti-money laundering legislation. The results of this enquiry will afford an 
understanding of the likely reasons for non-compliance in Australian money transfer 
agencies. 
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
ADI: Authorised Deposit-taking Institution (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
AFP member: a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Agency: a Department of the Commonwealth, State or Territory, with reference to 
the term designated agency. 
Alternative Remittance: An alternative form of cash or value transfer which is 
provided outside of regulated formal banking systems. 
AML/CTF Rules: Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
AML/CTF: Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing. 
ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 
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ASIO Minister: the Minister responsible for administering the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
AUSTRAC: Australian Transaction Records Analysis Centre; Australia’s frontline 
AML/ CTF agency. 
Australian account an account held in Australia and relates to the definition of 
Australia (AUSTRAC, 2007).  
Australian government body: the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an 
agency or authority of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Black money: Funds gained through the process of money laundering, and money 
that is attained through black market enterprise (Kochan, 2005 p.289). 
Civil penalty order: an order whereby the Federal Court may order a person to pay 
the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Commercial goods carrier: a person who, in the normal course of business carries 
goods or mail for reward (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Commercial passenger carrier: a person who, in the normal course of business 
carries passengers for reward (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Compliance record: a compliance record is one that relates to the obligations of the 
reporting entity under the Australian AML/CTF Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Correspondent Banking: a relationship for the provision of banking services by one 
financial institution to another where the financial institutions are in different countries 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Designated Agency: Federal, State and Territory agencies that have access to 
AUSTRAC information (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Designated business group: An AUSTRAC authenticated business entitled to 
share customer identity information, have a joint AML/CTF program, lodge group 
compliance reports, and discharge various record keeping obligations (AUSTRAC, 
2007). 
Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions (DFNBP) - Non-financial 
businesses that are designated by AUSTRAC as at risk of being victim to and/or 
facilitating money laundering and terrorism financing. DFNBP’s include lawyers, real-
estate businesses, casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones, notaries, 
accountants, and trust and company service providers 
Designated Remittance Service: A regulated remittance business which is 
authorised by AUSTRAC to conduct money and value transfers (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Designated Service: A financial service that must be registered with AUSTRAC in 
order to ensure regulatory oversight to prevent the laundering of money or terrorism 
financing (Australia, 2012). 
Dirty Money: Money that is sourced from criminal activity and is not yet laundered, 
see also ‘Black Money’. 
DKYC Policy: don’t know your customer policy. 
Director-General of Security: the Director-General of Security holding office under 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
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Efficacy: Formal term for effectiveness; the suitability to generate an intended effect. 
False customer name: any name by which a person is not commonly known 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
FATF-GAFI: Financial Action Task Force. 
FATF Recommendations: the Recommendations and Special Recommendations 
as adopted by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) at its 
plenary and special plenary meetings on 20 June 2003, 31 October 2001 and 20-22 
October 2004 (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Financial institution: an ADI bank, building society or credit union and any person 
specified in AML/CTF Rules (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
FIU: A Financial Intelligence Unit that collects financial data for the purpose of 
detecting instances of money laundering and terrorism financing.  An FIU is a vital 
part of a nations AML regime, enabling law enforcement to take effective action to 
charge and convict offenders who commit crimes that predicate money laundering.  
Intercepting and reclaiming illegitimate funds and asset’s that would otherwise never 
be detected (Levi, 2002). 
Financing of Terrorism: An act that provides financial support to a registered 
terrorist organisation, whether through negligence, reckless action and/or inaction, or 
intentional criminal conduct (Australia, 2012). 
Financing of terrorism offence: an offence against section 102.6 (getting funds to, 
from or for a terrorist organisation), and Division 103 (Financing terrorism) of the 
Criminal Code.  Also an offence against sections 20 (dealing with freezable assets) 
and 21 (giving an asset to a proscribed person or entity), of the Charter of the United 
Nations Act 1945 (CotUNA), and offences in a State, Territory or foreign country 
which correspond to those offences (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
FSRB: FATF Styled Regional Bodies those sub-national organisations that emulate 
the FATF model on a regional basis (Jensen & Png, 2011). 
Governance: The act of running a state or nation in a way that encourages 
“...equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in 
a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring” (United Nations, 2012).   
Governance, Poor: The antithesis of governance.  Management of a nation that is; 
incompetent, illogical, tyrannical, unaccountable, inefficient, and ineffective (Moore, 
2001 p.386). 
Hawala: A familial based informal remittance system that is also known as 
underground or parallel banking.  Originally created in the Middle East, Hawala 
(meaning ‘trust’ in Arabic) and its relatives, like the Indian based ‘Hundi’ system, 
were born out of a lack of formal banking infrastructure.  
Informal Remittance: A remittance system that is not regulated or monitored, often 
operating out of direct view of the public, and to a specific ethnic customer base. 
IGIS: Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, IGIS is a designated agency 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
INGO: international non-government organisation 
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Integration: The third step in a standard money laundering act.  The once laundered 
money is further disguised by through ‘integration’ with a legitimate business (Choo, 
2008; Irwin et al., 2012). 
KYC (Know Your Customer): the identification policy implemented in reporting 
entities (RE) whereby an appropriate level of identification must be provided by all 
customers and recorded in order to legally transfer funds through a designated 
remittance service. 
Layering: The second step in standard money laundering modus operandi. This 
step involves ‘layering’ illegitimate funds into and through legitimate systems, 
generally in smaller amounts, to hide the origins of the funds.  The semi-clean 
money is then collected prior to ‘integration’ (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012). 
Money laundering (ML): The act of processing illegitimately gained funds in order 
to hide their origin and pass that money off as legitimate (Kochan, 2005 p.289).  Any 
conduct that amounts to offences against Division 400 of the Criminal Code or 
corresponding State or Territory or foreign country offences (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Money Service Businesses: A term used by the FATF and AUSTRAC to describe 
businesses in the industry of sending money, also known as an Alternative 
Remittance System. 
Penalty unit: a penalty unit under section 4AA Crimes Act 1914 is worth $110 
(AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Physical currency: all coins and printed money that are designated as legal tender 
and circulate as and are customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in 
the country of issue (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Placement: This is the first step of the standard three step process for laundering 
money.  It refers to the introduction of illegitimate funds to the formal economy prior 
to ‘layering’ (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012). 
Predicate Offence: An offence which precedes money laundering (i.e. drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, tax evasion etc) 
Primary photographic identification document means any of the following: 
 National or International Drivers License. 
 A passport issued by the Commonwealth. 
 International passport issued by foreign government or U.N.  
 Australian government issued national proof of age card with photo and 
signature.   
 A national identity card issued by foreign government or U.N. with a 
photograph and signature (AUSTRAC, 2007 b). 
Primary non-photographic identification document means any of the following: 
 Birth certificate or birth extract. 
 Citizenship certificate issued by the Commonwealth. 
 Citizenship certificate issued by a foreign government. 
 Birth certificate issued by a foreign government. 
 Pension card issued by Centrelink (AUSTRAC, 2007 b). 
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Promissory note: an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to 
another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay a sum of money on demand or at a 
fixed or determinable future time (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Regulated Entities: a collective term used to refer to the entities AUSTRAC 
regulates, including both ‘cash dealers’ (under the FTR Act) and ‘reporting entities’ 
(under the AML/CTF Act) (AUSTRAC, 2011 g). 
Reporting Entity: any registered and regulated remittance service provider that is 
monitored by AUSTRAC (also see Regulated Entities). 
Remittance: The act of transferring and/or converting value and/or funds. 
SCTR: significant cash transaction report: submitted to AUSTRAC under the FTR 
Act, in respect of a currency (coin or paper money) transaction involving AUD 
$10,000 or more (or the foreign equivalent) (AUSTRAC, 2011 g). 
Small Value Transaction: SVT, any remittance under $500 in value. 
Suitable: Able to generate an intended effect (Reinsch et al., 2004)  
Stored value card: a portable device that can store monetary value other than in 
physical currency form (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Taxation law: the term is defined to have the same meaning as in the Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (TA Act) (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Transfer: any act or thing that may reasonably be regarded as the economic 
equivalent of transfer. This extended definition is to put beyond doubt that the term 
covers alternative remittance arrangements where no money or property actually 
changes hands (AUSTRAC, 2007). 
Wire Transfer Remittance Service: also known as a telegraphic transfer, a wire 
transfer remittance service refers to a business that transfers funds locally and 




CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organised crime and terrorism flourish in countries with poor governance.  As 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ (1997) theory has continued to play out, the 
influence of poor governance has amplified criminal opportunities as the world’s 
cultures collide.  The events of September 11, 2001 were a good example of the 
significant impact poor governance can have on global economic security (NCTAUS, 
2004).  The attacks on the World Trade Centre towers activated a global push to 
combat terrorism on all fronts, including the methods by which it is financed.  Prior to 
this event, the act of money laundering was mainly viewed as a tool to evade tax and 
clean the proceeds of crime (Levi & Reuter, 2006).  The investigation into the 
September 11 attacks showed that along with formal financial systems, alternative 
systems such as Western Union and Hawala were also key sources of finance 
(NCTAUS, 2004).  As a result action was taken to regulate informal systems like 
Hawala and Hundi, and increase regulatory requirements within ARS internationally 
(Reuter & Truman, 2004).  Despite this, the exploitation of ARS has perpetuated, 
and informal remittance systems continue to operate illegally (Passas, 2003; 2006; 
Razavy, 2005; Rees, 2010). 
The Australian AML/CTF regulatory administrator AUSTRAC (in combination 
with the Australian Federal Police) is responsible for ensuring compliance in all 
Regulated Entities; this includes ARS agencies (AUSTRAC, 2007).  Regulation of 
ARS in Australia is legislated under the AML/CTF Act of 2006 (Australia, 2012).  This 
legal bill has applied a significant level of pressure to the average ARS agency, 
especially in terms of the need for technical knowledge and cost (Geary, 2009).  
Regulation of this type is insufficient to inhibit the risk of money laundering in ARS 
(Passas, 2006; Rees, 2010; Reuter & Truman, 2004).  Ordinary citizens are more 
concerned with social and community-based transactional frameworks than 
legislative compliance.  
The informal, cultural, and familial trust intrinsic to ARS and informal systems 
is attractive to citizens that originate in countries throughout Asia, the Middle East, 
and Africa.  The common ground held between ordinary citizens, organised 
criminals, and terrorists, complicates the illegality of unregulated remittance 
alternatives (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).  In order to effectively reduce the risk of money 
laundering, support for regulatory measures must take into account the eight barriers 
to compliance that persist as influential hallmarks of many centuries of informal 
money transfer business. 
2.2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING TERRORISM 
Money laundering is an act carried out to hide the origin of criminally sourced 
funds, property, or valuable assets (Levi & Reuter, 2006).  Hence the nature of the 
act makes it inherently difficult to measure.  Despite this it is estimated that a total of 
USD$870 billion in dirty money is earned annually through criminal enterprise 
(UNDOC, 2012).  Moreover approximately USD$150-$300 billion is laundered 
through informal remittance systems annually (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002 p.2; 
Rees, 2010).  This level of unchecked wealth is a significant threat to international 
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security because in comparison very little funds are needed to carry out an effective 
terror attack (Cook & Smith, 2010; NCTAUS, 2004). 
Combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism is a challenge 
which incurs a significant cost to society.  An impediment to this effort is the lack of 
broad access to accurate quantitative data, which would serve to better inform 
frontline stakeholders of a level of efficacy in terms of global anti-money laundering 
regulation (Levi & Reuter, 2006).  This is due to the confidential nature of financial 
transactions which restricts access to anti-money laundering data sets (Verhage, 
2010).  The international community is heavily reliant on the Financial Action Task 
Force to inform best practice in this area.  The FATF has established 49 
recommendations intended to direct best practice standards of AML/CTF regulatory 
governance (FATF-GAFI, 2012).  Despite the existence and support for this 
standard, not all countries are willing or able to implement effective changes (Moore, 
2001).  This is often due to economic restrictions and poor governance (ibid).  
Lacking holistic implementation of sound economic policy and governance, the 
international AML/CTF effort is consistently undermined by transnational organised 
crime and terrorist groups. 
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EFFORT 
There are three dimensions to the global anti-money laundering system.  
According to Reuter and Truman (2004), these are: 
a) A framework for building effective anti-money laundering systems,   
b) An effective legislative and law enforcement base, and  
c) A goals and compliance/cost reduction-focussed relationship between 
private and public sectors. (p.45)  
These dimensions are represented by a number of international systems 
supported and monitored by global NGO’s and inter-governmental bodies such as 
the FATF, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. The impetus for effective 
legal and enforcement processes, as well as the international AML framework, is 
built of systems supported by these bodies (and others) which aim to implement the 
40+9 recommendations and promote good governance (FATF, 2012; IMF, 2011; 
Schott, 2006).  The last dimension of the anti-money laundering effort is highly 
important because it provides the theoretical and logical grounding for effectiveness.  
Such efficacy may be beyond what is possible through mere oversight and direction 
of third parties and a willing government.  Without the incentive to operate outside 
regulatory oversight being significantly inferior to the benefits of compliance, holistic 
support for anti-money laundering regulations is very unlikely to take hold (Reuter & 
Truman, 2004).  In other words the positive outcomes of regulation need to outweigh 
the added cost. 
The discourse on international anti-money laundering, consistently refers to 
the system as being a ‘regime’ (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006; 
Passas, 2003; 2006; Irwin et al. 2012). According to Kern Alexander (1993), an 
international regime is defined as; “....a system of norms, standards, procedures, 
institutions and rules of conduct that constrain and shape state behaviour in a 
particular issue area” (p.231).  For Kern, regimes can be formal or informal and 
cover all legal obligations.  He posits that the purpose of an ‘international regime’ 
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(Alexander, 1993): “....is to regulate and control certain transnational relations and 
activities by establishing international procedures, rules and institutions” (p.231).  
Kern’s definition accurately describes the global anti-money laundering system. For 
the purpose of this research the international anti-money laundering effort or system 
may also be referred to as a ‘regime’.  
Figure 2. Two Pillars of the International Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
Pillar Levels Prevention Enforcement 
Formal 
Treatment Sanctions Confiscation 
Principle 








Diligence Predicate Crimes 
Fig 2. (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Levi & Reuter, 2006) 
There are two main avenues through which the international anti-money 
laundering challenge is tackled; prevention and enforcement (see Figure two).  This 
table is designed in the form of pillars to represent the basic structure of the 
international AML/CTF regime.  The foundation of the pillar-based regime structure is 
at the foot of the table representing the first line of defence against money 
laundering.  A step up each pillar represents an increasingly formal mechanism 
designed to reinforce the previous step (Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.46-48).  
The prevention pillar represents actions aimed at creating a deterrent for 
criminals that would exploit individuals and institutions to launder illegitimate funds 
(Reuter & Truman, 2004).  Implementing sanctions on people and organisations 
prevents the propagation of criminal and terrorist activity.  Sanctions generally take 
the form of major fines and are enacted upon detection of gross or persistent non-
compliance with AML/CTF regulations and laws (ibid).  Taking steps to regulate and 
supervise financial institutions, non-financial businesses, and activities is a vital part 
of inhibiting money laundering in a holistic manner (Levi & Reuter, 2006).  Ensuring 
the recording and reporting of all transactions, including suspicious transaction 
(SUSTR) activity, is of high importance in order to ensure that acts of money 
laundering and terrorism financing are detected in a timely manner.  These 
measures, when combined with effective Customer Due Diligence (i.e. the 
appropriate and diligent identification of all customers that use designated services), 
serves as an influential deterrent for service providers and criminals alike (ibid).  
The enforcement pillar, outlined in Figure three, is divided into four sections 
that cover the reactive legal measures employed to inhibit money laundering.  These 
are; 
a) Confiscation 




d) Predicate Crimes 
The effectiveness of law enforcement is reliant on the clarity of AML/CTF law 
in every jurisdiction. The skills, experience, and resources available to enforcement 
authorities also have a significant impact on the efficacy of anti-money laundering 
regulation (Reuter & Levi, 2006). It is important to criminalise predicate offences 
using clear and internationally accepted definitions, in order to ensure the efficacy of 
the global anti-money laundering system (Ridley, 2008). Furthermore, authorities 
must be capable of confiscating funds that are found to be the product of illegitimate 
activity after first being blocked or seized during an investigation (Levi & Gilmore, 
2003). These four levels of enforcement represent the minimum capability required 
for an effective AML/CTF system (Reuter & Truman, 2004). 
A vital component of the global anti-money laundering programme is the 
creation and support of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU’s) (Jensen, 2008). An FIU is 
an organisation that collects information and reports from relevant entities, and 
conducts in depth analysis to detect instances of money laundering (ibid).  The 
regulations under which an FIU functions should engage the agency in two ways 
(Masciandaro, 2005).  First it acts as a risk management tool and deterrent for non-
compliance, and secondly as a device to aid law enforcement to uphold AML/CTF 
law, although this is not the case for all FIU’s (ibid).  According to Walters et al. 
(2011) and Schott (2006), there are four different variations on financial intelligence 
units. These are; 
a) Administrative 
b) Law Enforcement 
c) Judicial or Prosecutorial 
d) Hybrid 
The Australian financial intelligence unit ‘AUSTRAC’ is an Administrative agency 
which functions as a support mechanism for law enforcement (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).  
An ‘Administrative’ FIU is well suited to sharing resources internationally, but 
generally lacks any power to take immediate action to inhibit detected instances of 
money laundering.  Conversely a ‘Law Enforcement’ FIU has the ability to act directly 
(Schott, 2006; Walters et al., 2011).  However, generally enforcement units are not 
open to co-operative progression with other FIU’s internationally.  Thirdly a ‘Judicial 
or Prosecutorial’ unit is highly independent and generally free of political influence.  
Yet this type of FIU may also be viewed as an extension of law enforcement and 
may face challenges interacting with other FIU’s (Schott, 2006; Walters et al., 2011).   
Examples of where administrative financial intelligence units can be found 
include Belgium, France and the United States.  Examples of countries with ‘Law 
Enforcement’ units include Germany, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Walters et al., 2011).  A ‘Hybrid’ style FIU is a mix of any of the three 
previously discussed categories (ibid).  The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units (see Figure four), provides useful services to equip new FIU’s with the skills 
and knowledge to effectively detect and deter money laundering, and a forum for the 
sharing of information and experience, to progressively improve FIU’s globally 
(Egmont, 2012; Schott, 2006).   
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One of the key challenges facing an anti-money laundering programme is the 
extent to which regulations require information to be gathered by a financial 
intelligence unit (Walters et al., 2011). For example, in the US suspicious 
transactions reports (SUSTR’s) are only required to be reported if above USD$2000, 
whereas in Australia all transactions and suspicious transactions reports are required 
to be reported and sent to AUSTRAC regardless of the amount (ibid).  For Australia 
the challenge of dealing with information overload, amplified by defensive over 
reporting, does not seem to be a concern (Rees, 2010).  In contrast the US attempts 
to avoid this issue, but is not alarmed by the standard mode of ‘layering’ illegal funds 
that may occur in amounts just less than USD$2000 (Irwin et al., 2012; Levi & 
Reuter, 2006).  For both nations ‘layering’ in amounts just less than $10,000 is also a 
major issue that has been overlooked (Walters, et al., 2011).  Both the US and 
Australia only require significant levels of identification when moving funds 
amounting to more than $9,999 (ibid).  These issues are fundamental cases of 
where to ‘draw the line’ on obligatory reporting of transactions, where arguments to 
lower or raise thresholds can be convincing on both sides. 
The regulatory difficulties congruent with attaining consistent and global 
implementation of anti-money laundering practices, illustrate the need for wide-
reaching legislation. Cross jurisdictional irregularities represent key weaknesses in 
global anti-money laundering action.  It is clear that in order to mitigate this issue 
substantially, the world’s nations would need to unite on strategic goals, and practice 
good governance regardless of economic, societal and cultural barriers (Ridley, 
2008; Levi & Reuter, 2006; Reuter & Truman, 2004).  Although this option is likely 
beyond an outcome that would be realised in the near future, it is also clear that 
positive outcomes in the transnational battle against money laundering can still be 
achieved.  The international anti-money laundering regime was built on the creation 
of the FATF in 1989 (FATF-GAFI, 2012 b).  Since then many positive changes have 
taken place, such as the mutual evaluations that led to the creation of the Australian 
AML/CTF Act of 2006.  However, the task to inhibit money laundering throughout the 
global economy has not yet been completed. 
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2.3.1 FATF and World Bodies 
The international anti-money laundering effort is supported and directed by 
many international non-government organisations (INGOs).  Figure three is an 
outline of the key international bodies that set standards relevant to inhibiting money 
laundering. The chart also includes a brief outline of the tools they employ to inhibit 
money laundering. 
Figure 3. AML/CTF Organisations that Set Standards 
International Body Anti-Money Laundering Instruments 
Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF, 2012 a; Schott, 2006) 
1. The Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering 
2. Monitoring Members’ Progress 
3. Reporting Money Laundering Trends and Techniques 
4. The NCCT List 
5. Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 
6. Methodology for AML/CFT Assessments 
United Nations (UN) 
(Jensen & Png, 2011; Schott, 
2006) 
1. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988) 
2. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999) 
3. Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 
4.Convention on Corruption (2003) 
5. Security Council Resolution 1267 and Successors (1999) 
6. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) 
7. Global Programme against Money Laundering 
8. The Counter Terrorism Committee 
Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision  
(Alexander, 1993; Schott, 2006) 
1. Statement of Principles on Money Laundering 
2. Core Principles for Banking 
3. Customer Due Diligence 
The Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence 
Units  
(Egmont, 2012; Schott, 2006) 
1. Training and exchange of employees to improve expertise 
2. Promoting operational autonomy 
3. Sharing knowledge to improve efficacy 
4. Systemising and expanding reciprocal co-operation 




1. Cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to 
international regulatory standards and good governance.  
2. Ensuring effective oversight and enforcement in order to protect 
investors. 
3. Address systemic risks. 
4. Enhance investor protection and promote investor confidence in the 
integrity of securities markets.  
5. Share information and experience to assist the development of 
markets, strengthen market infrastructure and implement appropriate 
regulation. 
International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS, 2012) 
1. Issues global insurance principles, standards and guidance papers.  
2. Provides training and support on insurance supervision issues 
3. Holds meetings and seminars for insurance supervisors. 
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Of the international organisations outlined in Figure three, the United Nations 
and the FATF lead global efforts in terms of anti-money laundering standards.  Four 
key international legal conventions have been created by the United Nations to 
inhibit money laundering (Jensen & Png, 2011): 
(a) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and  
 Psychotropic Substances (1988). 
(b)  International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing   
 of Terrorism (1999). 
(c)  Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 
(d)  Convention on Corruption (2003).   
Sanctions have also been adopted by the UN Security Council, pursuant to Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. The most notable Security Council Resolutions (SCR’s) of this 
type are Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and its amendments, as well as 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (Schott, 2006), 1540(2004), 1566(2004), 
and 1624 (2005).  These sanctions are specifically targeted at terrorism linked 
assets, and call on all member states of the UN to take effective action to inhibit the 
financing of terrorism (UNDOC, 2012 a). 
The Financial Action Task Force was established as an inter-governmental 
organisation by the United Nations (FATF-GAFI, 2012 b).  The central reason for the 
creation of the FATF was to oversee the design, implementation and progression of 
the 40 Recommendations first adopted in 1990 (ibid).  The main goal of this 
organisation is to achieve global implementation of FATF standards (FATF/OECD, 
2011). The discharge of these standards in turn promotes good governance globally 
and improves international legislative unity on acts that predicate money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism.  Moreover, in 2001 the FATF adopted nine special 
recommendations specifically focussed on countering the financing of terrorism, 
which together are now widely referred to as the FATF 40+9 Recommendations 
(Jensen & Png, 2011).  Despite the fact that the recommendations are not 
international legislative instruments, they still have extensive links to the fundamental 
guiding principles behind key UN Conventions and Security Council Resolutions that 
relate to anti-money laundering (Stessens, 2000). 
Figure 4. The 36 Members of the FATF 
FATF Members 
Argentina Finland Ireland Russian Federation 
Australia France Italy Singapore 
Austria Germany Japan South Africa 
Belgium Greece Republic of Korea Spain 
Brazil Gulf Co-operation Council Luxembourg Sweden 
Canada Hong Kong, China Mexico Switzerland 
China Iceland Netherlands, Kingdom of Turkey 
Denmark India New Zealand United Kingdom 
European 
Commission Portugal Norway United States 
Fig 4. (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c) 
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The Financial Action Task Force consists of 34 member jurisdictions and two 
regional organisations (see Figure four). The 36 members represent most of the 
major stakeholders in the global economy (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c).   The European 
Commission is the representative body for the European Union as a whole, acting in 
the interest of the European Union in a holistic sense (FATF-GAFI, 2012 d). Similarly 
the Gulf Co-operation Council represents the various stakeholders of the Middle 
East; however unlike the European Union, none of the Gulf States (i.e. Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are members of 
the FATF (FATF-GAFI, 2012 f).  These states are also well known as large 
international hubs for informal value transfers and money laundering (Maimbo, 2003; 
Maimbo & Passas, 2006).  As a result the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was 
established and inducted as a member of the FATF. As such the Gulf Co-operation 
Council is committed to the implementation of the 40+9 Recommendations in its 
region.  In taking action to achieve this goal, the Gulf Co-operation Council carries 
out mutual evaluations to determine the progress of AML/CTF legal and regulatory 
action in the Gulf States (ibid). 
Figure 5. FATF Styled Regional Action Groups on Money Laundering 
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Fig 5. (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c) 
In order to effectively oversee the global implementation of the FATF 
standards, regions are managed by individual organisations that monitor and provide 
advice (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c). These regional action groups seen in Figure five are 
officially termed FATF Styled Regional Bodies.  These NGO’s have been established 
to provide support and oversight to nations implementing the globally accepted FATF 
40+9 Recommendations (FATF-GAFI, 2012 e). 
2.3.2 International Anti-Money Laundering Support Bodies 
The FATF understands that the global issues with money-laundering are so 
complex in structure that they require a host of support bodies, which work on a 
regional and sub-regional basis (FATF-GAFI, 2012 c). These NGO’s fill the gaps in 
AML/CTF interaction that would otherwise proliferate in a ‘Nation-State’ only model. 
FATF Styled Regional Bodies are different from support bodies because they carry 
out the duties of the FATF in a regional sense, and they are the primary mutual 
evaluation organisation for their given sector (Levi & Gilmore, 2003; Jensen & Png, 
2011). In contrast, support bodies often have other functions beyond the straight-
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forward response required to inhibit money laundering (IMF, 2012; Schott, 2006; 
CTCED, 2011; UNDOC, 2012 a). 
Figure 6. Key International AML/CTF Support Bodies and Services 
 
Anti-Money Laundering Support Bodies Anti-Money Laundering Services Provided 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012; 
Schott, 2006)  
'Macro-economic Focus' 
1. Economic Policy Advice to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. 
2. Temporary Finance to prevent economic 
collapse. 
3. Technical advice and training to build economic 
expertise and effective institutions. 
4. Promoting international monetary cooperation. 
5. Facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade. 
6. Promoting foreign currency exchange stability. 
7. Assisting in the establishment of multilateral 
systems of payments. 
World Bank 
(Schott, 2006) 
'Fighting World Poverty' 
1. Economic Policy Advice. 
2. Temporary Financial aid for developing countries.
3. Technical advice and training to build economic 
expertise and effective institutions. 
4. Building private and state partnerships. 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTCED, 2011) 
‘Combating Terrorism’ 
1. Technical Assistance. 
2. Country Reports. 
3. Individual state consultation on implementing 
international standards on CT.  
4. Organising 'special' meetings to build 
relationships and communication between relevant 
bodies and stakeholders. 
Global Programme against Money Laundering 
(UNDOC, 2012 a) 
 
Advisory services to;  
-states/jurisdictions and Financial intelligence units 




There are 31 regional and international support bodies that provide services 
to nations to help them implement the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (FATF-GAFI, 
2012 f).  Of these, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are good 
representations of NGO’s which offer AML/CTF services to achieve compliance with 
international financial standards, and membership status in the FATF.  These 
organisations grant economic and policy advice, financial aid, technical advice and 
training to build economic experience and increase efficacy in key institutions (IMF, 
2012; Schott, 2006).   
Counter-terrorism is a critical tool in the effort to inhibit money laundering and 
to protect the integrity of the global economy.  At the head of the international CTF 
support bodies, forged by the UN, is the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The 
Counter-Terrorism Committee is run by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (CTCED), and is primarily tasked with providing aid to UN member states 
to effectively counter terrorism (see Figure six).  This includes tasks very similar to 
the IMF and World Bank but instead with a direct focus on counter terrorism 
(CTCED, 2011). Effective counter-terrorism measures are vital to maintaining 
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international security.  Central to success in counter terrorism, is the control of 
financial flows to prevent the enabling of terrorist activity through financial restriction 
(Irwin et al., 2012; Kochan, 2005).  Therefore the ability to launder money has a 
direct correlation to the threat of terror attack.  
Another key support body is the Global Programme against Money 
Laundering (GPML).  The GPML was established in 1997 by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) (UNDOC, 2012 a).  The impetus for creating 
the Global Programme against Money Laundering was a mandate given to the 
UNDOC as a result of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The programme was later strengthened in 
1998 by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Political 
Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering.  As a result the GPML 
special mandate was expanded beyond drug offences to include serious criminal 
acts (ibid).  Like the IMF and the World Bank (IMF, 2012; Schott, 2006), the GPML 
assists all nations to adopt international AML/CTF standards (UNDOC, 2012 a).  The 
Global Programme against Money Laundering contributes to the AML/CTF effort by 
providing advice to states and FIU’s as well as training, which includes e-learning 
courses, workshops and seminars.  The organisation also operates a mentor 
programme to promote growth of knowledge, experience, and co-operative 
relationships between countries (UNDOC, 2012 a).  The Global Programme against 
Money Laundering is a generic support organisation designed to aid all countries in 
implementing and operating AML/CTF systems and regulations effectively. 
2.3.3 US Legislation 
The United States anti-money laundering system is used as a model by many 
countries.  This is because the US anti-money laundering system is regarded as the 
pioneer of international AML/CTF regulation, and the US economy is significant 
within the context of global trade (Reuter & Truman, 2004).  The key features of the 
US anti-money laundering programme are; 
a) The PATRIOT Act, 2001. 
b) Law Enforcement based financial intelligence unit. 
c) Three separate offences for money laundering. 
The PATRIOT Act was created in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon in 2001, to substantially increase the prevention and enforcement 
power behind the United States anti-money laundering system (Congress, 2001).  
This legislation is of note because it enables US law enforcement authorities to 
pursue warrants to arrest offenders on foreign soil (Reuter & Truman, 2004).  This 
includes all predicate and money laundering offences under the PATRIOT Act (ibid).   
The cross jurisdictional reach of the PATRIOT Act is representative of the 
sharp end of a broader trend in the international anti-money laundering system.  
According to Levi & Reuter (2006), the international anti-money laundering system 
has evolved over decades into a system used by the international community as a 
‘self evident’ regulatory programme.  They posit that it is now taken for granted that 
the prevention of predicate crimes is justification for interfering in the legal practices 
and criminal justice systems of other states (Levi & Reuter, 2006 p.308).  In this 
regard Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCT’s) are publicly named when 
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they fail to meet the standard set by the FATF (Levi & Gilmore, 2003).  While the 
PATRIOT Act is a more direct form of intervention that has stemmed from an earlier 
culture of international financial intrusion by the US (Reuter & Truman, 2004 p.309), 
the international community has followed suit in a less direct manner (Levi & 
Gilmore, 2003). 
The US financial intelligence agency, known as the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), is a law enforcement based financial intelligence 
unit (Walters et al., 2011). FinCEN works in direct collaboration with authorities and 
employs a ‘follow the money’ method for detecting financial crime and terrorism 
(FinCEN, 2012).  The US, like the United Kingdom (UK), has three separate offences 
for money laundering.  The three offences defined by US law (AIC, 2009; Congress, 
2001) are: 
(a) Conducting a transaction using the proceeds of crime with the intent to 
disguise its origins, avoid a transaction report or commit another 
offence;  
(b) Transporting the proceeds of crime into, out of, or through the United 
States with the intent to disguise its origins; and  
(c) Conducting transactions with funds represented as the proceeds of crime. 
(AIC, 2009 p.2; Congress, 2001) 
The US offences are very specifically aimed at the movement of funds.  Conversely 
the United Kingdom offences include not only transactions but also possession of 
stolen property (AIC, 2009).  The US and Australia also have legislation which 
makes reporting mandatory for all transactions over $10,000, commonly known as a 
‘spending statute’ (AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Congress, 2001). 
2.3.4 Australian Legislation 
Money laundering is legislated as a criminal act under Division 400 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which was added to the Criminal Code in 2003 by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (AIC, 2009).  Australia has one of the most complex 
money laundering offence lists in the world, consisting of 19 separate offences 
(Brown, 2009).  These can be separated into two groups; funds generated by an 
illegal activity, and funds used to conduct an illegal activity.  Similar to United 
Kingdom law, possession of stolen goods or property is a singular money laundering 
offence.  Under these conditions, an offence attracts a maximum penalty of 2 years 
(Australia, 2005).  However the other 18 offences under the ‘funds used to conduct 
an illegal activity’ section are separated based on the value of assets and the intent 
of the offender.  Similarly punishment increases in severity based on the sum of 
funds involved and the offenders’ knowledge of the funds’ origins (ibid).  
Corresponding severity of punishment with the denomination of funds is set out in 
bands.  According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (2009), these are;  
a) $1,000,000 or more;  
b) $100,000 to $999,999; 
c) $50,000 to $99,999;  
d) $10,000 to $49,999;  
e) $1,000 to $9,999; 
f) Funds of any value. 
In addition, there are three offences that apply to each band.  Regarding which 
offences apply to each case, again the knowledge of the offender and his/her 
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intended use for the funds are key points of reference for the level of punishment 
(Australia, 2005).  In terms of prevention and regulation Australia has legislated two 
key Acts, the Financial Transaction Records Act (FTR) 1988 (2011), and the Anti-
money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007; 
Australia, 2012). 
Businesses and organisations that provide financial services of any kind, as 
defined in section six of the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012), are designated 
service providers.  This means that any entity providing any one of the 54 different 
financial services outlined in section six, must submit to regulatory oversight by 
registering with AUSTRAC directly (Brown, 2009).  AUSTRAC labels entities that 
provide designated services collectively as Regulated Entities (RE’s) (AUSTRAC, 
2012).  Under the AML/CTF Act 2006, a Regulated Entity is also required to send 
annual compliance reports to AUSTRAC, carry out ongoing Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD), as well as implement and maintain an effective and tailored risk management 
plan to reduce the risk of money laundering (AUSTRAC, 2007 b p.23-26; Australia, 
2012).  Under the AML/CTF Act 2006 Regulated Entities are generalised as financial 
institutions that provide a designated service, however some also fit into the 
following three categories; 
a) Designated Business Group. 
b) Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP) 
c) Designated Remittance Service (DRS) 
Designated Regulated Entities are service providers that have registered with 
AUSTRAC and have taken immediate steps to ensure regulatory compliance under 
the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012).  Being a designated service provider 
means you are cleared to operate that service provided AML/CTF risk management 
systems and processes are ongoing.  A designated business group is any 
commercial group of service providers that have been authenticated as compliant by 
AUSTRAC.  As a result the group is entitled to share customer identity information, 
have a joint AML/CTF program, lodge group compliance reports, and discharge 
various record keeping obligations (AUSTRAC, 2007).  According to Alistair Brown 
(2009), the Regulated Entities covered by the Designated Non-Financial Businesses 
and Professions term are “casinos, precious metals and stones dealers, lawyers,.. 
notaries, real estate agents, accountants, and trust and company service providers” 
(p.10).  Thirdly, a Designated Remittance Service is defined as an authorised money 
or value transfer system (AUSTRAC, 2007).   
In 2005, Australia’s AML/CTF regime was audited by the FATF through a 
‘mutual evaluation’ process (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b).  The audit found that significant 
changes were required to bring Australia’s AML/CTF regime in line with international 
AML/CTF standards (Brown, 2009; FATF-GAFI, 2005 b). In response to the audit 
results, a year later Australia enacted The Anti-money Laundering and Counter 
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Australia, 2012), which built upon 
existing obligations under the Financial Transaction Records Act 1988 (Australia, 
2011; Brown, 2009). The new legislation affected a significant expansion of 
AUSTRAC’s regulatory remit (AIC, 2009; AUSTRAC, 2007 b; Brown, 2009).  
AUSTRAC has since expanded from 154 (FATF-GAFI, 2005 a) to 294 employees 
(AUSTRAC, 2012 c), and regularly collects transaction and compliance information 
from over 16,000 Regulated Entities (ibid). 
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Figure 7. Australian Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Outcomes 















POCA s 81, s 82 1 9 0 1 3 0 1 0 15 
Criminal Code  
s 400 n/a 5 6 11 14 40 42 50 168 
AML/CTF Act n/a n/a n/a n/a 16 37 9 12 74 
FTR Act 131 168 79 76 53 23 19 17 566 
Total 132 182 85 88 86 100 71 79 823 
Fig 7. (Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 2011, cited by Walters et 
al. 2011 p.68) 
The Australian anti-money laundering regime is unique and highly complex.  
The effectiveness of Australia’s anti-money laundering system is difficult to measure 
because there has been very few money laundering convictions in comparison to 
other member nations, i.e. United Kingdom and Hong Kong,  (AIC, 2009; Brown, 
2009).  This issue was also highlighted in the 2005 mutual evaluation of Australia’s 
anti-money laundering programme (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b).  Figure seven shows that 
between 2002 and 2010 Australia dealt with 823 offenders for money laundering 
related offences.  Whereas according to the Australian Institute of Criminology 
(2009), between February 2003 and December 2005 the United Kingdom handed 
down 910 convictions and 492 custodial sentences (Harvey, 2008 cited by AIC, 
2009).  Figure seven suggests that anti-money laundering legislative outcomes are 
on a downward trend.  Furthermore the enforcement of the United Kingdom’s anti-
money laundering legislation has been significantly more effective in only two years 
in comparison to the outcomes achieved through the Australian anti-money 
laundering system over eight years.   
2.3.5 FATF Recommendations and Worldwide Compliance  
The international community behind the global anti-money laundering effort 
has built the system into an unrivalled international regulatory machine.  According to 
Levi and Reuter (2006 p.308), this is evident because unlike the early years of the 
global push to implement the 40+9 recommendations, the modern international 
community “now takes it for granted that the objective of preventing drug trafficking, 
fraud, and terrorism entitles it to intervene in the laws and practices and criminal 
justice activities of other states, particularly the less powerful ones” (p.308).  The 
push for worldwide compliance with the FATF 40+9 recommendations continues to 
act as a collective international government would, to reduce crime and secure the 
global economy.  
Significant aspects of the international anti-money laundering system are the 
mutual evaluations carried out by the FATF and its affiliates, using a specific method 
based on the 40+9 recommendations (FATF-GAFI, 2005 b).  Mutual evaluations are 
carried out by the FATF, its regional bodies, and affiliated NGO’s, on a cyclical basis 
to determine the efficacy of a nations anti-money laundering system (ibid).  These 
audits are primarily intended to provide a third party perspective for countries which 
are having difficulty implementing the FATF 40+9 recommendations (Levi & Gilmore, 
2003).  This process is designed to induce a state of cross-jurisdictional consistency. 
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The lack of which prevents the enforcement of anti-money laundering law across 
international borders (Reuter & Truman, 2004). 
The main focus for the FATF and the myriad of anti-money laundering support 
bodies is the standard of compliance in developing and emerging nations.  In the 
Asia-Pacific region, 24 countries have undergone mutual evaluations since the 
beginning of 2004 (Jensen & Png, 2011).  These countries are part of the Asia 
Development Bank and have made positive changes to their anti-money laundering 
programmes as a result of the audits.  Regardless, the economic and political 
instability of these nations inhibits most efforts to implement and maintain economic 
regulation (ibid).  Jensen and Png (2011), hold that in order to effectively progress 
with regard to international anti-money laundering compliance, the international 
community must take into account the unique environment and cultural factors of 
each developing nation.  In support of this statement, Levi and Reuter (2006) posit 
that in order to improve the rate of money laundering and counter-terrorism financing 
inhibition, authorities must look beyond international regulations and look to other 
vectors in order to move forward.  This point is important because it relates to the 
push for compliance in the broader ARS sector, which is an extension of the culture 
and tradition of economic processes born of developing countries with ancient 
cultural history (Cook & Smith, 2010; Passas, 1999; 2003; 2006).  Thus authorities 
that oversee the regulation of ARS businesses on a domestic level should also attain 
and draw on an understanding of these factors, as the international community 
should when developing and implementing standards in developing countries (Cook 
& Smith, 2011 a; Jensen & Png, 2011; Passas, 2006). 
2.4 MONEY LAUNDERING IN PRACTICE 
Money laundering is closely linked to tax evasion, both of which are an 
evolution of shadowy traits evident throughout the history of trade practice.  In the 
late 16th century, transatlantic slave trade between Madagascar and the new states 
of America was booming.  However there was illegitimate competition between the 
royally licensed English East India Trading Company (EITC) and colonial pirates 
(Platt, 1969 p.549).  The pirates would use the EITC’s trade route to purchase slaves 
and transport them to neutral American slave colonies (ibid).  This meant that the 
pirates were able to trade slaves without purchasing an expensive license from the 
EITC.  This example is evidence of two key traits seen in the global black market of 
the 21st century.  The first is a proclivity for trade to meet demand in spite of any 
negative impact on society. The second is humanity’s persistent propensity to find 
and exploit weaknesses in economic regulatory systems.  Today organised criminals 
and terrorists exhibit the same traits established centuries ago, only the acts are 
more complex in line with the intricate structure of the global economy (Cook & 
Smith, 2011; UNDOC, 2012; Findlay, 2008; Ridley, 2008; Irwin, Choo, & Liu, 2012).  
Money laundering is a tool used specifically to evade tax and disguise the 
origins of criminally sourced funds (Reuter & Truman, 2004).  There are many forms 
of highly profitable criminal activities that predicate money laundering. Such acts 
include scams, a myriad of cyber crimes, fraud, identity theft, racketeering, illicit drug 
and weapons trade, and human trafficking/sex slavery (APG, 2011; Sullivan & Smith, 
2012).  These acts undermine the stability of the global economy and have a 
significant negative impact on the lives of millions of people.  Some of the impact is 
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realised as hardship, poverty, loss of life, damage to the environment, and corruption 
(APG, 2011; Moore, 2001; Sullivan & Smith, 2012).  
 
Phishing scams are one of the lowest risk/high profit crimes in a large list of 
modern predicates to money laundering. Every year billions of dollars are lost to 
phishing scams (McCombie & Pieprzyk, 2010). Phishing is a form of identity theft 
that uses social engineering and fraud for financial gain.  The act is very effective 
due to the low standard of internet user security awareness, and it is easy to carry 
out but hard to investigate and convict (Birk et al., 2007).  Often a victim is sent an 
email that appears to be from a popular institution i.e. Facebook or a bank, 
suggesting that there is an error with their account.  The victim invariably clicks a link 
in the email and they are taken to a fraudulent site that, to the untrained eye, looks 
legitimate.  When the user types their login information on the site, their details are 
stolen and sent back to the perpetrator (Microsoft, 2012).   
A study conducted by Irwin et al. (2012), found key differences between the 
money laundering practices of criminals and terrorists.  The study analysed 146 
standard money laundering and 38 terrorism financing typologies.  The results of 
stage one of the study suggests that criminals and terrorists have different 
preferences for laundering techniques, and that using more techniques within the 
layering, placement, and integration model (Choo, 2008), increases the amount of 
funds that are successfully laundered.  The study also found that, unlike standard 
criminals, terrorists prefer to use only a few techniques which ensure high levels of 
anonymity.  Moreover, the denomination of funds layered into financial systems were 
generally lower than the ‘spending statute’ (Walters et al., 2011), threshold of 
$10,000 (Irwin et al., 2011).  One of the most important findings within the study was 
that the amount of money laundered by criminals and terrorists was significantly 
different.  Where the average maximum across the 146 standard money laundering 
typologies was AUD $65.8 million, only a AUD $4.8 million average maximum was 
found in terrorism financing cases across the 38 typologies.  These figures have 
important implications for the progression of the Australian and international anti-
money laundering regime. 
The profits derived from predicate crimes are dirty and are easily traced by 
law enforcement to their criminal sources.  So in order to disguise dirty money as 
having a legitimate origin, the standard modus operandi is to take a series of three 
sequential steps known as Placement, Layering, and Integration (Levi & Reuter, 
2006).  This process enables organised criminals to use their illegitimate funds in the 
regulated economy, without fear of detection.  This is the fundamental motivation for 




2.4.1 Money Laundering in Three Sequential Stages 
Figure 8. Stages of Money Laundering 
Stages of Money Laundering 
Placement Introduction of funds or asset to legitimate financial system. 
Layering Distancing funds or asset from source origin, whether criminal or legitimate. 
Integration Change of funds into legitimate income via standard business or fiscal enterprise. 
Fig 8. (Choo, 2008; Irwin et al., 2012; Levi & Reuter, 2006) 
There are three sequential steps taken to launder illegally sourced funds and 
assets (Figure eight).  The first stage is the point where the funds or assets are 
placed into the global economy.  It is important to note that in the case of terrorism 
financing, the assets or funds may be from a legitimate source (Levi & Reuter, 2004).  
One example of layering with funds may be to purchase Stored Value Cards (SVC’s) 
from multiple businesses online or via fax.  There are many merchants who provide 
this service and do not require face to face contact or provision of valid identification 
to make a large purchase of SVC’s (Choo, 2008).  Placement of an asset, such as a 
boat or car, could be achieved simply and without identification via one of the many 
online private auction sites such as eBay, if sold for under AUD $10,000 (Cook & 
Smith, 2010).   
To distance the funds from the origin, certain Stored Value Cards can be used 
overseas and are promptly sent for retrieval at an ATM in another country.  If this is 
not possible then the SVC’s can be used to purchase popular goods and 
repackaged, then sold domestically or sent overseas for resale (Choo, 2008; Irwin et 
al., 2012).   Integration is carried out differently by organised criminals as opposed to 
terrorists.  Criminals will seek to further legitimise and profit from their money by 
investing in ordinary and legitimate enterprise or financial operations.  On the other 
hand, a terrorist organisation will simply distribute their funds as required to continue 
their operations (Reuter & Truman, 2004). 
2.6 ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 
Networked systems of remittance that operate on the grounds of familial 
relationships and trust have been operating for centuries (Cook & Smith, 2011).  
Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, these informal remittance and value 
transfer systems have been a prime target for regulatory intervention as a part of the 
global anti-money laundering regime (Cook & Smith, 2010).  Since then the 
regulated offspring of IVTS has been considered to be an 'alternative' to formal 
financial systems, hence the term 'Alternative Remittance System' (ARS).  However 
ARS is a 'first-world centric' description for systems that have existed and operated 
for many years before the birth of formal economic systems (Rees, 2011). 
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Figure 9. ARS International Network 1 (Cash Pool) 
 
Fig 9. (Keene, 2007) 
Figure 10. International ARS Network 2 (Direct) 
 
Fig 10. (Keene, 2007) 
 
Figure 11. International ARS Network 3 (Bank and Direct) 
 




Common operational structures can be identified easily in ARS businesses, 
some of which can use multiple banks as intermediaries or cash pools to settle 
informal debts (Figures nine, ten & eleven).  
Alternative remittance systems exist in many different forms however all share 
a common structure with each other, which varies in complexity (Keene, 2007).  The 
standard operating procedure of an alternative remittance system is a transaction 
between a sender in Country A and a receiver Country B.  The sender in Country A 
contacts the ARS agent and takes payment which includes a small fee.  In a 
regulated agency information is recorded about the sender and receiver, and 
identification is sighted and recorded as part of the transfer process.  A code is then 
given to the sender who communicates it to the receiver.  Meanwhile, sending agent 
A contacts the disbursing agent in Country B, who in turn alerts the receiver 
regarding the funds to pick up.  In some cases the funds can also be delivered (Cook 
& Smith, 2010; Keene, 2007; Maimbo & Passas, 2003).  The key characteristic of 
informal and alternative remittance systems, is that daily operations require no 
physical transfer of funds.  Instead an informal debt is recorded between transfer 
agents and is settled at regular intervals.  This can be done through cash payments 
through a courier, postal orders, cheques, wire transfers, and bank transfers (Keene, 
2007; Passas, 1999; Rees, 2010).   
Other methods include trade settlement through the purchase of precious 
stones, gold, or other valuable assets (Walters et al., 2011).  ARS agents generally 
have bank accounts in central locations to reduce transfer costs.  Popular sites for 
IVTS funds consolidation include Dubai, New York, London, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore (Passas, 2003; Perkel, 2004).  The legality of these processes depends 
on the country in which the transfer systems are operating; these processes are not 
used exclusively by illegal IVTS systems (Walters et al. 2011; Rees, 2010). 
The regulation of alternative remittance systems is a task which is balanced 
on a knife’s edge. This challenge is embodied by the need to impose strict control of 
monetary flow to maintain security, and the necessity to allow flexibility to enable the 
legitimate existence of semi-formal systems which allows progression and growth 
throughout the global economy (Jensen & Png, 2011).  This is a common theme 
which characterises the greater majority of modern security issues in which 
responses often restrict societal freedoms at times of crisis to maintain security 
(Soma et al., 2004). The regulation of informal systems has not preceded the end to 
security issues within the ARS community.  The effort to balance security and 
operational flexibility when regulating the remittances sector has left in its wake 
significant weaknesses.  These are flaws which continue to be exploited by 




2.6.1 International Exploitation of ARS 
The informal nature of ARS and their networks leaves them open to 
exploitation from within and without.  There are many cases of innocent and unaware 
people responding to a Phishing email, sending money through a system like 
Western Union on instruction and never hearing from that international contact 
again.  For example in 2010 one case of scamming through ARS exploitation 
involved organised criminal groups sending phished funds out of Australia to an 
intermediary in Africa.  That person would then use Western Union and MoneyGram 
agencies to transfer the money on to a Russian crime gang minus a fee (McCombie 
& Pieprzyk, 2010).  ARS transfers are difficult to track and are almost impossible to 
link to a receiver, especially in countries where regulations do not require agencies 
to record and keep validated information on their customers. 
The Ussama El-Kurd case highlights alternate remittance exploitation from 
within a business.  This incident involved a money exchange franchise operating in 
the UK called Bureaux de Change.  According to Kochan (2005), Ussama El-Kurd 
was convicted of laundering approximately £70 million of dirty money as a Bureaux 
de Change franchisee.  Investigator’s who gathered evidence, later used to convict 
Mr El-Kurd, found that Ussama’s well oiled laundering business managed to 
convince banks to convert the money for easier transfer because he understood his 
business.  By informing the Banks, when questioned, that he was converting funds 
for a large number of exchange agencies, Ussama’s couriers were able to avoid any 
unwanted suspicion.  Mr El-Kurd’s share of the money that he converted and 
transferred was 3.5% or approximately £3.5 million (Kochan, 2005 p.228).  The 
laundering and transferral of illegitimate gains can be an enticing proposition, when a 
simple process can produce extraordinary results (Rees, 2010 p.51-58).   
Some of the largest and most at-risk alternative remittance systems are 
entirely online.  The online auction site and payment system eBay/PayPal exists as 
one of the world’s largest transnational informal sales platforms. It can be classified 
as an alternate remittance system because the PayPal arm of the eBay Corporation 
operates partially outside formal financial systems of control (Cook & Smith, 2010).  
According to their 2011 annual report, eBay has over 100 million registered regular 
users from almost every country in the world (eBay, 2011).  The informal aspect of 
the PayPal system means that any user can set up an account, and sell an item for 
up to US or AUD $9,999 on eBay, without the need for validation of primary 
identification (AIC, 2009; Australia, 2012).  Furthermore, there is no way to 
determine whether goods are sent or received. Nor is there any way to validate the 
authenticity of an items’ description in comparison to what is sent, if at all (Daily Mail, 
2006).  The nature of the eBay/PayPal sale process effectively renders every user a 
private remittance operator (eBay, 2011; Cook & Smith, 2011).  This represents a 
major loophole in the attempt to regulate online auction and payment systems.  For 
example, if a terror organisation lists an imaginary item on eBay from Australia at 
AUD$9,500, and a counterpart in Pakistan was organised to purchase the item, then 
the illegitimate transaction is covered by a seemingly legitimate auction (Daily Mail, 
2006).  This process would not require any item to be sent, the money would arrive 
without arousing suspicion, and in the same way a similar process would bring funds 
into Australia.  The threat posed by this issue has largely been ignored due to the 
enormity of the system and the task at hand (Cook & Smith, 2010). 
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Figure 12. Abuse of Hawala or Hundi System into India 
 
Fig 12. (Sharma, 2006) 
 The criminal use of informal systems is just one part of the threat posed by 
unregulated systems (see Figure 12).  The threat of terrorism is also enabled by 
Hawala and Hundi agents that are unaware or willingly facilitate the laundering of 
illicit funds (Passas, 1999; 2003).  International cases of abuse in Hawala and Hundi 
systems are abundant and well documented.  In one international case a Pakistani 
national, referred to as Mr. X, living in Canada pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder 
money.  The accused operated an unregulated Hawala business in Montreal, 
Canada which made regular international transfers through a network of people and 
businesses outside of the formal economy.  A witness cooperating with authorities 
contacted Mr. X posing as a criminal involved in high level transnational crime, 
including drug trafficking and counterfeit cigarettes.  Under instruction the witness 
professed a desire to use Mr. X and his Hawala business to transfer the proceeds of 
drug trafficking to support these criminal acts. As a result, between 2004 and 2005 
Mr. X and a co-defendant Mr. Y made 10 transactions, laundering a total of USD 
$828,000 (MONEYVAL & FATF/OECD, 2010).  
In 2011, a US money laundering case involved the exploitation of Western 
Union by the former Mayor of a town called Nogales in Arizona.  Ex-Mayor Octavio 
Garcia Von Borstel set up a company called Legalizaciones to cash cheques and 
acquire Western Union money orders free of charge through his father’s remittance 
business, called Western Cash Express (Smith, 2011).  In total the ex-mayor and his 
father, Octavio Garcia Suarez, defrauded Western Union of USD $618,000.  
Western Union became aware of a discrepancy and carried out an investigation 
which found evidence of money laundering.  Western Union took action to recover 
losses and subsequently won a civil law suit against the father and son.  Law 
enforcement were informed and as a result Von Borstel was convicted and 
sentenced to three and a half years in prison with seven years probation,  and his 
father received two years prison with seven years probation (Smith, 2011). 
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2.6.2 ARS in Australia 
Australia’s ARS community is diverse and supports many ethnic communities 
by providing easy access to low cost international money transfers.  According to 
David Rees (2010), there are five major ethnic communities in Australia which rely 
heavily on ARS to send money home and abroad. These are the Filipino, Somali, 
Indian, Vietnamese, and Samoan communities.  The most prevalent areas for ARS 
business supporting these communities are Sydney and Melbourne, with modest 
numbers of ARS agencies in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia 
(ibid).  A survey of 395 international students in Australia also found evidence to 
suggest that there is a prevalent South Asian community that makes regular use of 
informal and alternative remittances (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).  The study also 
supports David Rees (2010), in the claim that the primary reasons behind the level of 
expatriate reliance on alternative remittances in Australia are due to issues of trust 
and familial ties (Cook & Smith, 2011 a; Rees, 2010). 
Figure 13. Remitters Registered with AUSTRAC as of June 2011 
Financial Year (Aus) 2008–09 2009–10  2010–11 
Registered Remitters  5401 6,117 6,927 
Change from previous 
year (%) 109% 13% 13% 
Fig 13. (AUSTRAC, 2011 h) 
There is a steady increase in the number remitters registered with AUSTRAC 
as of June 30th, 2011 (Figure 13).  AUSTRAC recognises that Australia’s remittance 
community is changing rapidly (AUSTRAC, 2011 h).  The number of registered 
remitters doubled in the 2008-09 financial year from approximately 2450 to 5410, a 
109% increase.  Since then each year has seen remittance business increase by 
13%, coming to 6,927 by the end of June 2011 (ibid).   
The Australian ARS community is characterised as dynamic, with very few 
barriers to entry and exit from the sector (AUSTRAC, 2011 h).  The industry is highly 
progressive, and AUSTRAC witnesses regular transfers of ownership and the 
frequent addition of new agents in Australia’s principal ARS networks (ibid). This 
unique business community is dominated by Western Union (WU) and its affiliation 
with Australia Post (Post, 2012; 2012 a).  There are approximately 5000 WU 
agencies in Australia (Western Union, 2010), and approximately 3,200 of them are 
Australia post outlets that provide Western Union remittance services (Post, 2012 c). 
The remaining WU outlets (an estimated 1,800) exist as third party remittance 
providers in local convenience, money exchange, fast food stalls, and grocery stores 
(Cook & Smith, 2010 p.21).  Over and above the 6,527 ARS agencies which are 
affiliates of larger international networks, an estimated 400 small money remittance 





Figure 14. Australian ARS Businesses by Category 
Remittance Service Categories Remittance Characteristics and  Brand Examples 
Formal Transfer Focussed  
 No secondary business goals. 
 Transfers only to specific countries. 
 (i.e. iRemit) 
Semi-formal  
 Transfers may be secondary to main business. 
 Transfers to many different countries. 
 Provides online services. 
 Operates out of a shop front. 
 Advertises to the public. 
 (i.e. WU, PayPal, MoneyGram, Ez Money Express and 
UAE Exchange). 
Covert Non-Aligned  
 Operates out of an unlikely premise (i.e. Taxi, 
Restaurant, Butcher, Ethnic Video Store, and Private 
Residence). 
 Not Brand Affiliated. 
 Relies on word of mouth and familial networks instead 
of advertising. 
 Hawala, Hundi, and Black Market Peso style operations. 
Fig 14. (Based on extensive literature review) 
A review of the literature on remittance business has revealed three common 
categories of remittance service providers.  As outlined in Figure 14, remittance 
businesses can be categorised as Formal Transfer Focussed, Semi-formal, and 
Covert Non-Aligned remitters.  A formal transfer focussed remitter has no secondary 
financial imperative within the business and in some cases will only transfer to 
specific countries as their primary service is aimed at a specific expatriate 
community.  An Australian example of this type of remittance agency is the 
Philippine transfer agency known as iRemit (2011).   
A semi-formal ARS agency is likely to provide transfer services as a 
secondary feature next to the main economic imperative of the business, especially 
in shop-front businesses.  For example, common primary services surrounding semi-
formal remitters in Australia include news-agencies, chemists, convenience stores, 
fast food stalls, and post offices.  This category of remitter may be an entirely online 
service provider, will advertise to the wider public, and generally supports transfers 
to a large number of countries.  Branded semi-formal remittance businesses 
prevalent in the Australian ARS sector include Western Union, PayPal, MoneyGram, 
Ez Money Express, and UAE Exchange (Western Union, 2010; MoneyGram, 2012; 
PayPal, 2012; Post, 2012 c; Ez Money Express, 2012; UAE Exchange Australia, 
2012).   
A covert non-aligned money transfer operation is an underground and 
unregulated remittance business.  This category of remitter will often operate out of 
unlikely premises such as a taxi, restaurant, butcher, ethnic video store, or a private 
residence.  These remitters are not brand affiliated and will not advertise their 
business openly; instead agents rely on word of mouth and familial networks to build 
their client base.  A covert non-aligned remittance agent could also be called an 
‘underground banker’ (Borgers, 2009), and would likely structure their business on 
the Hawala, Hundi, or Black Market Peso style IVTS (Bunt, 2008; Passas, 1999; 
2003; 2006; Perkel, 2004; Sharma, 2006). 
The threat of money laundering through Australia’s ARS sector is well known 
to Australia’s anti-money laundering regulator AUSTRAC.  Money laundering is held 
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by Australia’s national security and law enforcement agencies to be one of three 
‘critical’ organised crime threats (National Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 
2010; 2011; cited by AUSTRAC, 2011 g p.5).  The threat is hard to quantify due to 
the unquantified nature of criminal activity, but estimates have been made.  
According to Choo (2008, p.3), approximately AUD $2-4 billion is laundered through 
the Australian economy annually.  What can be quantified with a little more accuracy 
is the cost of money laundering, which is estimated to be AUD $10-15 billion every 
year (AUSTRAC, 2011 g p.2).  Moreover in the year leading up to the end of the 
2011, Australia’s registered ARS agencies supplied international funds transfer 
instruction reports which totalled AUD $8.5 billion (ibid p.17).  Therefore it is clear 
that the significance of effective regulation and support to attain compliance in this 
sector is of paramount importance to Australia’s national security. 
2.6.3 The impact of Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 
on ARS Business 
The regulatory requirements applied by Australia’s anti-money laundering 
system to the money transfer sector are significant. Major factors include time, cost, 
and knowledge/understanding.  Remittance agents must meet extensive reporting 
requirements; including international funds transfer instruction reports, SUSTR’s 
(AUSTRAC, 2011 h), annual compliance reports (AUSTRAC, 2011 f), and Significant 
Cash Transfer Reports (SCTR’s) (Australia, 2012). 
The impact of lost time is also applicable to the overall cost of anti-money 
laundering compliance for ARS agencies.  According to AUSTRAC (2012 d), the 
overall cost of regulatory processes and action is AUD $32.3 million.  The 
supervisory levy set out for 2012-13 is based on the total operational cost of 
AUSTRAC.  Under this legislation ARS agencies pay a base component fee of $300 
annually and $0.01 per reported transaction (ibid).  Include with this fee the time 
spent reporting, carrying out risk management processes, training staff, the cost of 
increased labour hours and the negative impact on income as a result of reduced 
time spent with customers. All of these factors would have an impact on the 
profitability of an ARS business which could lead to non-compliance or failure of the 
business.   
The requirement for knowledge refers to the pressure applied to ARS 
businesses to create, implement, and maintain an effective risk management 
portfolio in their business.  This requirement is by far the most demanding of 
AML/CTF obligations due to the complexity of risk management in general.  
According to Joy Geary (2009), one of the major issues with non-financial Regulated 
Entities attempting to implement effective AML/CTF risk management in their 
businesses is a lack of historical sources.  Information required to make an accurate 
risk assessment include; national threat assessment reports, typology reports from 
relevant NGO’s and financial intelligence units (i.e. FATF, AUSTRAC, Egmont etc.), 
associated industry reports, and external consultation at significant cost (Geary, 
2009).  This type of information would be very difficult and time consuming to 
access, and would require a greater understanding of the issues surrounding money 
laundering in non-core financial businesses.  As a result it is highly unlikely that a 
kebab shop owner or a local news agent would spend the money or time necessary 
to make an accurate, or indeed progressively reviewed, risk assessment. 
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2.6.4 Exploitation of ARS in Australia 
The exploitation of remittance businesses is a global norm and Australia’s 
money transfer businesses have not been ignored in this trend. Every year an 
estimated AUD $2-4 billion is laundered through Australia’s financial sector (Choo, 
2008).  It is also estimated by Masciandaro et al. (2007 p.200), that money 
launderers generally take a 5 to 15% cut of the funds that they launder.  While these 
figures are just estimates, it is well known that organised criminality is persistent due 
to the highly profitable nature of the black market (UNDOC, 2012).   
A report on money transfer agencies which are suspected of profiting from 
human trafficking was published on August 12th, 2012.  One of the six suspected 
agencies is an Afghan convenience store, known as the ‘Alamadar Superstore’, 
which provides money transfer services to a local community of Afghani migrants.  
According to Stewart & Maley (2012), AFP investigators believe the Alamadar 
money transfer service is linked to a convicted human trafficker known as Haji Sakhi.  
This people smuggler, also known as Zamin Ali, was part of an earlier criminal group 
which organised and dispatched a large number of unseaworthy boats of asylum 
seekers to Australia from the late 1990’s to the early 2000’s. The police believe the 
three owners of the Alamadar remittance agency are relatives of Sakhi, and are 
profiting from commissions on funds paid to facilitate a surge of boats arriving in 
Australia (ibid).   
Furthermore the same report highlights similar suspicion in another of the six 
money transfer agencies under scrutiny, called the Parwaz Travel and Money 
Exchange.  This remittance business operates out of a store on the same street as 
the Alamadar business (Stewart & Maley, 2012).  Similar to the Alamadar case, the 
owner Inayatullah Nauroze is the son of a convicted human trafficker, known as 
Nauroze Ali or Haji Nauroze, who now works in his sons business.  Last year Haji’s 
exchange business in Pakistan was shut down by authorities as part of enforcement 
action to halt human trafficking activity.  In this case the AFP suspects Inayatullah of 
organising a network of Hawala agents to launder and facilitate the transfer of funds 
to bankroll passage by boat into Australia (ibid).  These cases highlight suspected 
trends linking remittance agencies with organised criminal activity.   
Another case in Australia found two directors of a money exchange business 
guilty on multiple counts of money laundering (AAP, 2007).  Azeez Ansari and Haja 
Ansari managed a remittance business called ‘Exchange Point’.  The currency 
exchange was investigated by a joint law enforcement group of five agencies which 
included the Australian Federal Police and AUSTRAC.  The Exchange Point 
business incorporated a money transfer service and had many contacts in its global 
network, with a significant number of them in Singapore.  The investigation found 
that the currency exchange had received over AUD $2.5 million to be layered into 
specific Australian bank accounts in amounts less than $10,000.  A cash pool was 
also set up with money provided by Australians which was used to allow access to 
cash internationally for the fund stakeholders.  This was facilitated by phone calls, no 
records were made, and no funds left Australia.  At the conclusion of their trial and 
an appeal, the Ansaris’ received prison sentences for a multitude of money 
laundering offences (ibid) 
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A Joint Task Force code-named ‘Gordian’ was established in May 2005 
(AUSTRAC, 2011 h).  This group was tasked with investigating the key 
configurations and networks used by organised criminals to launder money, evade 
tax, and finance their activities. The method used to disengage criminal networks 
was to target accountants, money remitters and the financial service providers 
assisting the various criminal entities. The task force investigation concluded having 
disrupted 16 criminal syndicates and charged 73 people with money laundering and 
drug offences. This included charges against seven main suspects for conspiring to 
launder AUD $93 million.  The laundering of the funds was intended to be achieved 
through money transfer businesses, partially to international destinations. In addition, 
three suspects were sentenced in 2009 to imprisonment of up to 10 years for money 
laundering and drug trafficking (ibid).   
The abuse of Australia’s remittance sector is wide spread.  This is supported 
by a media release from AUSTRAC in 2012, which highlights five separate 
enforcement actions due to non-compliance in money transfer businesses (2012 b).  
The continuance of this trend is also supported by evidence of organised crime 
groups targeting the alternative remittance sector in Australia to launder money. 
According to AUSTRAC (2011 g), enforcement authorities have detected criminal 
groups which are targeting money remittance agencies to launder the proceeds of 
crime.  Sources of the laundered funds, cited by AUSTRAC (2011 g), include: “...tax 
fraud, drug trafficking, tobacco smuggling, people smuggling, and advance fee fraud 
(such as ‘Nigerian’ scams)” (p.17).  As a result Australia’s alternative remittance 
sector is at significant risk of criminal exploitation on an ongoing basis, and cases of 
non-compliance with AML/CTF regulations and criminal exploitation are likely to 




CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines how the research was structured in terms of the methodological 
approach to data collection.  It also outlines the research based framework that 
provided the focus and direction for the study.  The chapter also discusses details of 
the data analysis process used to answer the principal and supporting questions.  
3.2 QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
This research project made use of a mixed-methods approach as the most 
appropriate way to provide a suitable framework for data sets collected in this study. 
This in turn enabled effective analysis of the results, and provided for in-depth 
discussion and conclusions derived from the research data.  This study used 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
Quantitative researchers seek to test impartial hypotheses through an 
examination of the link between variables.  This approach to research gives 
emphasis to precise data directed at quantifiable facts, represented in numerical and 
statistical format (Creswell, 2009). In other words, quantitative research is built on a 
perception of the world in which all experiences and events are observable and 
discernible facts (ibid). 
In contrast, the standard operating procedure for qualitative researchers is to 
use the collection process as a means to understand observable facts within a 
contextually precise setting (i.e. real world observation) (Creswell, 2009).  Qualitative 
research is generally conducted in a natural setting in order to make sense of the 
contextual significance of observable phenomena openly, without the aid of 
statistical analysis (ibid). 
This study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to draw on 
the strengths of both approaches while reducing the weaknesses associated with 
mono-method research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  A mixed method 
approach is applied in this research as a number of businesses enquiries analysed 
using both methods, and a set of quantitatively analysed international transactions. 
3.2.1 Study Analysis 
Analysis of research data was captured through a number of vectors.  For 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis, data was compiled into charts.  The 
qualitative data retrieved from phase one was directly represented in a simple flow 
chart, detailing a visual progression of the eight barriers to anti-money laundering 
compliance in ARS agencies.  A mixed methods approach was used in phase two.  
Data sets were extracted and collated into separate charts.  Quantitative data points 
collected in phase two were represented in charts in percentile form, which allowed 
in-depth discussion on the state of legislative adherence in ARS agencies.  Phase 




3.3 RESEARCH ORIGINS AND FOCUS 
This research provides a unique insight to the standard of legislative 
adherence in Australian ARS agencies.  Prior research found that the practice of 
informal remittances persists despite the illegality of such systems under anti-money 
laundering legislation.  Furthermore, the ongoing use of informal (illegal) remittance 
services is motivated by a culturally-based lack of trust in formal banking systems, 
rather than a desire for criminal gain (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).  In this context there 
may be other factors (outside of legal adherence) that explain the practice of 
transferring money through informal remittance services.  The practice of ARS 
transfers exposes a problem in Australia’s regulatory system, which operates in a 
formal ‘Western’ manner.  As a result fails to address the key factors which may 
influence the choice of money transfer system within the community.  Therefore it is 
assumed that if culturally sensitive changes are made to Australia’s regulation of the 
ARS sector, then the persistence of high risk unregulated remittance activity will 
diminish.   
The results of the research analysed in chapters five and six, provide 
evidence to support the need for greater cultural awareness, rather than stronger 
regulation in the ARS sector.  This research reveals non-compliance in the ARS 
industry, propagated by the existence of eight significant barriers to compliance for 
remittance providers, which range from cultural, environmental, and trust based 
networks, to commercial and regulatory opportunism. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined the theoretical framework used to support the research 
materials and methods. In order to answer the principal question behind this study a 
mixed methods approach was taken.  Quantitative data was collected from business 
inquiries and international transactions to discern a level of legislative adherence in 
ARS agencies. With qualitative data collated through an extensive literature review 
informing the existence of eight significant barriers to anti-money laundering 
compliance in ARS.  The use of mixed methods in this study is intended to increase 
the strength and validity of its results.  The research based origins of this study have 
led to a focus on the ARS sector, and the need for greater cultural awareness in its 





CHAPTER FOUR: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the materials and methods used to 
effectively answer the principal and supporting research questions posed in this 
study.  In order to achieve this goal a seven stage method was used which includes 
three distinct data collection phases.  This chapter will discuss in detail the three 
phases of data collection engaged by this project, the reliability and validity of the 
research, and outline details of the ethical clearance granted to this research project. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This project was modelled in seven stages in order to effectively collect and 
analyse the research data (see Figure 15).  The three stages consisted of an 
extensive literature review (Phase 1), a series of business enquiries (Phase 2), and a 
set of international transactions (Phase 3).  This research used a hybrid approach to 
data collection. 




4.2.1 The Literature Review as Phase One 
The first step in the research process was to gain a broad understanding of 
the literature in order to inform the design of the research project.  For the purpose of 
this project, the literature review is classified as Phase One of the collection process.  
This is primarily because, in conjunction with prior research, the literature supports 
the existence of eight significant barriers to compliance for ARS agencies.  This 
theory underpins the first supporting research question.  
 
Figure 16. Eight Significant Barriers to Regulatory Compliance in ARS 
 
The literature review draws from more than 100 sources, with the key authors 
being Nikos Passas (1999; 2003; 2006; Maimbo & Passas, 2005), Michael Levi (Levi 
& Gilmore, 2003; Levi & Reuter, 2006), and Peter Reuter (Reuter & Truman, 2004; 
Levi & Reuter, 2006).  The secondary goal of the review was to build the foundation 
for measuring legislative adherence in alternative remittance systems.  This was 
achieved by exploring and analysing Australian and international legislation, and the 
relevant literatures.  A key publication for this study was The Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, which is archived in the Emerald database (Emerald-Insight, 
2012). 
4.2.2 Business Inquiries as Phase Two 
Business inquiries were carried out by phone and email with the primary focus 
on the standard transfer practices that occurred in each ARS agency contacted.  The 
first step in this process is outlined in Stage 2 of the research process chart (see 
Figure 15), which was to identify ARS agencies using local and online sources. 
Figure 16 depicts the range of local and online sources accessed to identify ARS 
businesses.  Of a total of 88 Australian remittance providers who were originally 
identified, a total of 50 remittance providers were contacted, whilst a further 38 
providers were discarded as being unreliable and difficult to authenticate.  A total of 
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remaining 13 were sourced online.  Contact was made with 17 licensed Australia 
post offices (LPO’s), and six franchised Australia post outlets.  A further eight travel 
businesses were contacted (including the Flight Centre franchise), all of whom 
provide MoneyGram transfer services.   
Figure 17. Local and Online Sources for Business Enquiries 
Community 
Newspapers Online Sources 
Indian Link  Australia Post Office Locator 
Oriental Post Yellow Pages 
Australia Asia Business 
Weekly www.moneygram.com 
Oriental Leisure & Living Flight Centre Store Locator 
Australian Migration 
Times www.whitepages.com.au 
Australian Chinese Times www.truelocal.com.au 
The Epoch Times Perth 
Edition www.aussielocal.com.au 
 
Calls and emails were made in an anonymous manner as a new customer 
would who has little knowledge of money transfers and their associated regulations.  
Phone contacts made up the majority of inquiries. There were 48 calls enabling 
extensive data from multiple agencies, which took place over a twenty one day 
period.  Furthermore, emails were expected to demonstrate a lack of direct contact 
with staff, whilst delivering only a small amount of information in a relatively longer 
period of time (1-2 days).  Thus although very few email contacts were made (2), the 
information gathered through phone contacts enabled a greater depth of observation 
and built the foundation for supporting question two.   
 
Throughout the phase two collection process, the researcher was able to 
complete the majority of inquiries and record adequate detail on a pre-prepared call 
sheet, which prompted the researcher to ask the relevant questions (see Figure 18).  
The most effective opening to an inquiry was found to be a polite greeting followed 
by reference to a friend’s advice, inferring that the contacted agency provides 
remittance services.  Assuming an affirmative response, the researcher would then 
outline a need to transfer a friend some money, beginning with AUD $300, to a 
destination in Asia.  Certain transfer destinations were limited to specific countries, 
usually based on the ethnic background of each specific agency.  The researcher 
would determine this aspect of the ARS service based on the context and details 
observed in the source (i.e. newspaper or website), prior to the inquiry. 
If during the course of a contact phone call, the staff member cited no 
requirement for identification, the researcher would prompt the staff member with a 
general question.  This inquiry was regarding any further requirements to 
successfully carry out a transfer.  If this prompt resulted in a negative response, then 
the ‘No ID required’ box was checked.  This method enabled the researcher to avoid 
directly raising the question of identification requirements in order to evade false 
positives in the data.   
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Figure 18. Business Inquiries Call Sheet 
 
 
Any identifiable details recorded in relation to individual ARS businesses were 
intended as a guide for the researcher only, and have been withheld to satisfy the 
ethical and privacy concerns of this data collection.  The call sheet was designed to 
record general details among specifics about international transfers (i.e. identification 
requirement, fees, and in some cases a maximum transfer rate was discussed), in 




4.2.4 International Transactions as Phase Three 
In phase three of the data collection the researcher processed six 
international transactions of varying amounts.  The purpose of this phase was to see 
if customer identification standards extend beyond national borders. By testing 
remittance agencies with small value transactions it was possible to categorise areas 
of identification and user verification non-compliance based on country of 
destination, speed of transaction, and cost of transaction. Each transaction also 
established the customer record-taking practices of each remitting agency. Each 
agency was also characterised in terms of their practice of recording and supplying 
financial receipt information. The data collection also revealed information about the 
process of transfers by international remittance agencies which send money into 
Australia.  More specifically, data was sought on identification standards both in 
Australia and in other countries. The collection captured information about the 
exchange rate, and the contact protocol for the receipt of monies (see Figure 19).  A 
single transfer was made to Zimbabwe, three transfers were made through Kenya 
and Dubai, and a set of two transfers were made to and from Pakistan. Transfer 
records were returned via email. 





4.3 RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, AND ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
This study was intended to examine a small sample of money transfer 
agencies and their legislative adherence in Australia’s alternative remittance sector.  
The study is reliable and valid in the context of showing the results of a small number 
of remitters and their compliance trends in the ARS sector.  This study is limited in 
external validity and as such there is a strong case for further research in this area to 
test the results of this study.  In order to conduct this study the researcher posed as 
a customer trying to transfer money internationally. As a consequence, the 
researcher was required to obtain ethical clearance through the Edith Cowan 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), due to the legislation-
focussed testing conducted in the research.   
4.3.1 Deception and the need for Anonymity:  
The data collected from remittance agencies included the prospect of 
obtaining data about staff and employees who may have allowed small value 
transactions without the full compliance with Australian legislative requirements in 
regards to identification. In order to proceed with the collection of this data, all 
enquiries and transactions have been undertaken as if the researcher was in fact an 
ordinary customer seeking to remit money to an international destination. This 
involved deception. Before any data collection was commenced ethics clearance 
was obtained to allow such data collection to take place under these conditions. All 
information was recorded according to the ethical guidelines set out and all 
information pertaining to individual remittance agencies has been maintained in an 
anonymous format. The ECU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) granted 
ethics for this research on the basis that it met the requirements of the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (Government, 2007 a). 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion this chapter has detailed the methods and materials used in the 
process of this research project.  The seven stages (see Figure 15) of the project 
were discussed incorporating a three phase data collection process.  The first phase 
covered the eight significant barriers to compliance in ARS businesses discovered 
by the literature review (phase one).  The second phase outlined the system used to 
collect data from ARS agencies in order to determine a state of legislative adherence 
within money transfer businesses.  The international transactions initiated in phase 
three were undertaken in order to gain a greater understanding of transfer services 
and the operations of ARS agencies which send money to and from Australia. Finally 
the reliability, validity and ethical clearance attained to conduct this study was 
discussed.  This section held that the research carried out in this project should be 
viewed as a relatively small sample of indicative legislative adherence in the ARS 
sector only, and that there is a strong case for further research to test the results of 
this study.  Ethical clearance was obtained from Edith Cowan University in order to 




CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter five provides detail and analysis on the results of all three phases of data 
collection.  Phase one results will cover data revealed by the literature review 
detailing the eight barriers to anti-money laundering compliance in Australian money 
transfers.  Phase two outlines a description and analysis of results collated from the 
50 business inquiries in order to answer the principal question.  Phase three 
presents the data collected from six international transactions and provides analysis 
of the results.  A summary of findings is also given at the conclusion of this chapter. 
5.2 PHASE ONE – THE EIGHT BARRIERS TO REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
The literature review carried out in this project was intended to inform and 
support the measurement of legislative adherence in alternative remittance 
agencies.  Upon completion of an extensive review of the literatures, the researcher 
developed a theory based on a well-developed understanding of alternative 
remittance systems.  This understanding provided a platform for the categorisation of 
a number of significant barriers to anti-money laundering compliance. 
Figure 20. Eight Significant Barriers to Regulatory Compliance in ARS 
 
The eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance (see Figure 20) are based on 
observations made from a literature review of over 100 sources.  All eight points are 
analysed and prioritised in terms of significance. This is done in reference to 
compliance within the context of the broader ARS sector, and the threat of 
exploitation to national security.  The prioritisation of barriers is expressed in Figure 
20 through shades of grey, with the darkest showing the greatest risk of exploitation.  
The lightest shaded barriers still represent significant barriers to compliance but are 
not as likely to greatly increase the risk of exploitation to launder money as a factor 





2. Limitation of 
Knowledge and 
Understanding
3. Allure of Large 
Profits 
4. Time, Money 













5.2.1 First Barrier: Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures 
The first and most significant barrier to AML/CTF compliance in the ARS 
industry is drawn from the lack of cultural awareness evident in the design of 
Australia’s regulatory controls for alternative remittance services.  After the attacks 
on the World Trade Centre in 2001, nine special recommendations were drawn up 
by the FATF to combat money laundering, which includes Special Recommendation 
VI.  This recommendation states that; 
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, 
including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or 
value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer 
system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the 
FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that 
carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal 
sanctions. (FATF-GAFI, 2010) 
The way in which these recommendations are enacted is up to each individual 
nation.  In this context Australia’s anti-money laundering regime, which is designed 
to meet FATF AML/CTF standards, has designed and implemented regulations for 
the ARS sector in a similar style to the US and UK (AIC, 2011).  However despite the 
formal and strict nature of Australia’s AML/CTF regulations on the operation of ARS 
services, the use of informal systems of remittance by ordinary Australian expatriates 
continues (Cook & Smith, 2011 a). 
The use of informal Hawala and Hundi style services is pervasive (Passas, 
2003; Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Cook & Smith, 2011 a).  Studies have found that the 
general use of informal remittance systems is motivated by a cultural lack of trust in 
formal banking systems, rather than a desire for criminal gain (Hammond, 2011; 
Passas, 2003).  In this context there is a reasonable explanation for operating an 
informal remittance service.  This conclusion exposes the flaw in Australia’s anti-
money laundering framework, which has designed ARS regulations from a formal 
‘Western’ perspective, and as a result fails to address this fundamental cultural 
impasse evident in the money transfer community.  Furthermore the US style of 
alternative remittance regulation lacks validity due to a paucity of research on the 
effectiveness of compliance measures in the remittance sector (Passas, 2006).  
Therefore changes need to be made to Australia’s regulation of the remittance 
sector. These alterations should be based on; consultation with the ARS community, 
an understanding of the impact of cultural factors associated with the traditional use 
of money transfer agencies, and academic research submissions relevant to issues 
in the Australian remittance sector.  If this occurs then the persistence of high risk 





5.2.2 Second Barrier: Limitation of Knowledge and Understanding 
The second most significant barrier to compliance is the standard of 
knowledge and understanding required of money transfer agents in order to comply 
with Australian AML/CTF legislation.  Issues informing this barrier include; the 
complexity of risk management requirements, a lack of appropriate training and 
education, and  a lack of understanding with regard to the threat posed by the risk of 
money laundering and terrorism financing.   
Australia’s AML/CTF regime requires that money transfer agents design, 
implement, and maintain a risk management portfolio as part of their everyday 
business.  This requires that remittance agents develop a personal understanding of 
risk management or employ a consultant at significant cost to implement a risk 
management portfolio (Australia, 2012).  Moreover all agents and their staff must be 
trained in effective customer due diligence (CDD) processes, detection of suspicious 
transactions and fake I.D., and compliance reporting requirements applicable to 
transactions over AUD $10,000, including transactions to and from high risk 
countries (AUSTRAC, 2007, 2007 a, 2011, 2011 a).  In order to aid agents in 
meeting this standard AUSTRAC has created a risk management guide for small-to-
medium sized businesses (AUSTRAC, 2006), and set up a multi language help desk 
(AUSTRAC, 2011 a). 
This barrier to compliance is a result of the complex nature of Australia’s 
regulatory regime, which requires a high level of knowledge and understanding on 
behalf of alternative remittance agents.  This is significant because remittance 
agents are unlikely to understand the threat posed by the risk of money laundering. 
This is due to the following factors: 
a) English is generally a second language for agents. 
b) Money transfer agents are unlikely to have a wealth of experience 
detecting indicators of money laundering and terrorism financing. 
c) The majority of remittance agents are small business owners who are 
unlikely to have taken a course in risk management. 
d) The effective design, implementation, and ongoing review of a risk 
management portfolio, requires greater understanding of the process than 
is afforded to an agent by reading a short guide. 
e) Training staff when the agent has a limited understanding of these 
concepts is unlikely to be effective.   
Therefore if agents are unable to grasp the significance of the fundamental drivers 
behind the costly and time consuming risk management and training requirements, 
then they are unlikely to remain compliant with AML/CTF regulations.  The pressure 
to perform may also be a sufficient motivator for an agent to operate an unregistered 
or underground transfer service. 
5.2.3 Third Barrier: The Allure of Large Profits 
The third major barrier to legislative compliance in money transfer agencies is 
the allure of large profits.  Every year an estimated AUD $2-4 billion is laundered 
through Australia’s financial sector (Choo, 2008).  It is also estimated by 
Masciandaro et al. (2007 p.200), that money launderers generally take a 5 to 15% 
cut of the funds that they launder.  While these figures are just estimates, it is well 
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known that organised criminality is persistent due to the highly profitable nature of 
the black market (UNDOC, 2012).  Therefore it is valid to infer that a transfer agent 
would make significantly more profit even if they were to take on a 
compartmentalised role in the laundering process. 
A report published in August 2012 (Stewart & Maley, 2012) details a number 
of suspected cases involving Australian remittance agents supporting criminal 
activity to accrue large profits. This detailed an ongoing investigation into the funding 
of people smugglers through six remittance agencies in the Dandenong area of 
suburban Melbourne (Stewart & Maley, 2012).  Although the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) were not willing to comment specifically on the situation, the 
investigators did express concern that six independent Hawala style money transfer 
businesses were facilitating the funding of organised crime groups, involved in 
human trafficking by boat into Australia (ibid).   
The significance of this trend is also supported by evidence of organised 
crime groups targeting the alternative remittance sector in Australia to launder 
money. According to AUSTRAC (2011 g), enforcement authorities have detected 
criminal groups which are targeting money remittance agencies to launder the 
proceeds of crime.  Sources of the laundered funds, cited by AUSTRAC (2011 g), 
include: “...tax fraud, drug trafficking, tobacco smuggling, people smuggling, and 
advance fee fraud (such as ‘Nigerian’ scams)” (p.17).  Based on the points and 
cases highlighted here, there is a valid trend supporting the significance of the allure 
of large profits as a major barrier to anti-money laundering compliance in Australian 
remittance agencies.   
 
5.2.4 Fourth Barrier: Time, Money and the Lack of Resources 
The Australian AML/CTF regulatory regime imposes a significant number of 
requirements on remittance agencies.  This includes the implementation of a 
comprehensive risk management portfolio (Australia, 2012), ongoing training of staff, 
and an in depth understanding and knowledge of complex AML/CTF risk 
management concepts (AUSTRAC, 2006).  On top of this money transfer agents 
must also have the ability to detect and deny suspicious transactions, which includes 
recognising fake identification (AUSTRAC, 2007, 2007 a, 2011, 2011 a).  The 
complexity and cost associated with these requirements represent significant 
barriers to compliance for money transfer agencies, which are in general operated by 
everyday citizens who are unlikely to possess the necessary resources to uphold 
such a stringent and complex risk management regime. 
The impact of time on a money transfer business is also an important factor if 
the remittance business is genuine in its attempts to have an accurate assessment 
of its risk. In order to achieve and maintain compliance, a significant amount of time 
can be spent reporting, carrying out risk management processes, training staff, and 
enduring its impact on profitability. All of these factors could lead to non-compliance 
or the failure of the business (in worst case scenarios).  In addition there is a AUD 
$300 supervisory levy fee collected by AUSTRAC, which includes a one cent fee per 
reported transaction, to recoup the cost of regulation (AUSTRAC, 2012 d).  It is 
important to note that many remittance agencies are small businesses.  Many of 
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which serve small ethnic communities, and are popular due to their low cost 
operations and the cultural and familial trust-based networks that they share with 
their customers (Cook & Smith, 2010; 2011 a).  Therefore the compliance 
requirements imposed on these agencies are likely to act collectively as a substantial 
barrier to compliance. 
5.2.5 Fifth Barrier: Commercial Imperative 
The next major barrier to compliance in Australia’s remittance sector is the 
prioritisation of commercial imperative over regulatory compliance.  The emphasis of 
profit outcomes over best practice is a common trend across many customer service 
industries.  This tendency is often characterised by the sacrifice of customer service 
standards in order to cut costs and improve profits. This can occur in many different 
forms within regular business, and it is not an illegal practice.  However given the 
significant regulatory pressure on remittance agencies, it is likely that AML/CTF 
compliance would be sacrificed in order to improve the flow of business. This would 
likely be a choice made in an attempt to improve customer satisfaction by reducing 
processing time (i.e. waiving the need for full identification compliance), therefore 
increasing the popularity of the business and its profit margin.  
5.2.6 Sixth Barrier: Familial and Trust Networks 
Familial and trust networks play a significant role in alternative remittance 
systems (Hammond, 2011; Shehu, 2004; Maimbo, 2003; Cook & Smith, 2011 a).  
Multiple communities of South Asian and Middle Eastern people make regular use of 
informal remittance systems.  This is because of a culturally based trust in IVTS and 
alternative remittance providers above formal financial systems (ibid).  For 
expatriates of developing countries, the roots of distrust in formal financial systems 
stem partly from a persistent trend of instability and corruption throughout their 
countries history (Maimbo, 2003 p.37; Rees, 2010 p.15).  This experience is a key 
influencing factor in the decision to use informal or alternative financial systems.   
Furthermore, money transfer agencies exist in general as small businesses 
with single owners or franchisees.  This means that an expatriate of any of the 
alternative remittance reliant Australian ethnic communities (i.e. Filipino, Somali, 
Indian, Vietnamese, and Samoan) (Rees, 2010), has the opportunity to develop a 
relationship with the transfer agent in order to garner trust.  When compared to the 
nameless face behind a branded bank or financial institution which may change 
frequently, the factor of trust is significant (Cook & Smith, 2011 a).   
However, the trust based relationship between agent and customer is also a 
substantial barrier to compliance. The familial and trust based relationship between 
money transfer agents and their customers stands as a motivator for complacency 
and non-compliance.  This is because it is likely that once a customer is known to a 
money transfer agent, the heightened familiarity is likely to undermine AML/CTF 
regulations, especially in terms of identification requirements and suspicious 
transaction reporting.  In simple terms an agent that is familiar and friendly with a 
customer is more likely to ignore identification procedure or disregard a suspicious 
transaction when dealing with that customer.  Consequently a relationship of 
heightened trust and familiarity stands as a significant barrier to AML/CTF 
compliance.   
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5.2.7 Seventh Barrier: Informal Legacy 
Remittance systems used by developing countries, (such as Hawala and 
Hundi), have been operating for over 100 years prior to the existence of the first 
formal banking systems (Buencamino & Gorbunov, 2002; Passas, 2003).  Modern 
day nations in Africa, Asia, and throughout the Middle East, still rely heavily on 
‘informal’ or, in a Western context, ‘alternative’ systems of remittance (Passas, 
1999).  Other factors which lead developing countries to rely on money transfer 
businesses include; access to financial services without the need for personal 
identification, access to low cost services not available in formal financial sectors, 
and the informal nature of transfer agencies allows customers to build a relationship 
of familiarity with a transfer agent (Maimbo & Passas, 2005; Rees, 2010).  Therefore 
it is clear that the appeal of money transfer agencies is persistent globally because 
they allow grass roots, low income access to financial services which are culturally 
appropriate for their customers.  Alternative remittance systems also allow 
developing, conflict ridden, and economically unstable countries to gain access to 
much needed funds when formal systems have failed (Maimbo, 2003; Razavy 2005).   
As a result previously informal remittance agents may find it difficult to adjust 
to their new responsibilities. This means that the history of informal remittance may 
compromise the application of AML/CTF processes within a transfer agency.  As a 
result an agent may be averse to any change in procedure, and may continue 
operating in an informal manner whist ‘cooking the books’ on paper (Cook & Smith, 
2010 p.16).  This type of non-compliance has occurred in the past and was detected 
by AUSTRAC (AUSTRAC, 2012 a).   
5.2.8 Eighth Barrier: The Informal Environment – 
(Where Remittance businesses sell other goods as well) 
The eighth barrier to compliance is focussed on the influence of an informal 
environment. This is where a business may transfer money, but may also be 
involved in the sale of other goods (e.g. Meat products, Fast food, Postal services, 
and even videos). This is likely to undermine the strict formality required under 
Australian AML/CTF regulations. The influence of an alternative remittance agent’s 
informal environment could reduce the adherence to regulatory procedures within 
money transfer agencies for a number of reasons.  Firstly, alternative remittance 
agents typically operate a transfer service within their primary business.  This means 
that their primary focus is may extend to unrelated business such as selling 
groceries, making kebabs, or even renting movies (Cook & Smith, 2010).  Secondly, 
these small businesses are not likely to conduct their business activities in a formal 
manner, allowing other services to act as distractions to AML/CTF compliance. 
These factors are present in the majority of Australian remittance agencies which 
explains why the influence of this informal environment may lead to an informal 




5.3 PHASE ONE: CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, these eight barriers are moderated by the impact of the first 
barrier; Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures.  The second, fourth, and fifth 
barriers are influenced by Australia’s overly prescriptive anti-money laundering 
regulations.  The remaining barriers are clearly amplified by cultural factors.   
The significance of all eight barriers to compliance in the Australian AML/CTF 
system is apparent when seen from their aggregated effect upon remittance 
businesses. Whilst individually each barrier impacts upon compliance, as a package 
they represent a stronger obstruction. Firstly, the Australian anti-money laundering 
system has been designed absent of the cultural awareness necessary to effectively 
regulate the alternative remittance sector.  In response to this changes need to be 
made to regulations. Secondly, money transfer agents face a significant barrier in 
terms of their limited understanding of what is necessary to achieve compliance 
under Australian law.  Thirdly the money transfer sector is at a disadvantage from 
bureaucratic and criminal expectations, with the allure of criminal profits made more 
significant by overbearing and uninformed regulations.  In the fourth instance, 
alternative remittance agencies lack the necessary resources to achieve compliance 
under AML/CTF regulations.  As such the allure of unregulated operation is 
amplified; this represents a significant threat to Australia’s national security.  The fifth 
barrier to compliance highlights the influence of a money transfer agent’s commercial 
imperative over the top of compliance, where the effective sale of primary services is 
likely to take precedence.  The sixth barrier refers to customer trust relationships 
based around familiarity.  The seventh barrier highlights the opportunity to side-step 
regulatory control by cooking the books.  The eighth barrier challenges AML/CTF 
compliance through a shared focus on unrelated sales and services.  
5.4 PHASE TWO RESULTS: BUSINESS INQUIRIES 
The phase two data collection process consists of a total sample size of fifty 
business inquiries made to Australian remittance agencies (n=50). This data group 
provides answers to the principal research question.  It achieves this by highlighting 
legislative adherence trends within the Australian remittance community.  
Figure 21. Primary Photo Identification Standards 
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Fig 21. (AUSTRAC, 2007 b) 
To ensure clarity about the segmentation of different identification 
requirements, Figure 21 indicates five types of primary photo identification in ARS 
agencies (AUSTRAC, 2007 b).  These are; a national or international driver’s 
license, an Australian passport, a passport issued by a foreign government or the 
United Nations, a proof of age card issued by the Commonwealth, or a national 
identity card issued by a foreign government or the United Nations (ibid).  Any other 
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form of identification, such as a student card, is not considered valid and indicates 
non-compliance with Australia AML/CTF regulations.  





















Photo I.D. 29.4% 33.3% 90% 52.6% 48% 
Student 
I.D. 70.6% 66.6% 10% 31.5% 46% 
No I.D. 0 0 0 15.7% 6% 
Total 34 % 12% 16% 38 % n=50 
The ARS agencies contacted in this phase were organised into four 
categorical business types (see Figure 22).  Australia Post outlets (which provide 
Western Union (WU) transfer services) exist in two forms, Licensed Post Offices 
(LPO’s) and Franchised Offices.  The other two groups into which the store-front 
ARS agencies have been categorised as; Travel Businesses which provide the 
MoneyGram brand of ARS service, and Independent Store-front Business’s.  
Data was aggregated against all four categories. Licensed post outlets 
accounted for 34% of the data, franchised post at 12%, and travel businesses at 
16%. Independent store-front businesses represent 38% of the total data set (see 
Figure 23). 



















Total 34 % 12% 16% 38 % n=50 
5.4.1 Australia Post and Western Union 
Australia Post is a Government Business Enterprise which is owned entirely 
by the Commonwealth of Australia (Post, 2012 a). Australia post provides over 100 
vital official services through its 4,400 outlets, which includes 2,934 Licensed Post 
Offices (LPO’s) and 29 franchised stores (ibid).  These products and services include 
but are not limited to; providing complete passport and license application services, 
bill payment, travellers checks, foreign currency exchange, stationary, entertainment 
and educational media and software, commemorative collectables (Post, 2012), and 
international remittances through the globally recognised ARS, Western Union (Post, 




Figure 24. Comparison of Franchised and LPO’s 
Franchised Post Office Licensed Post Office (LPO) 
Access to Management and Business 
Systems. Access to Management and Business Systems. 
Comprehensive training to be completed 
before agreement begins and on-going 
professional training and support. 
All training of staff is mandatory and the 
responsibility of the owner. 
10 year term with exit payment on 
expiration 
License has no set term and can be assigned 
at any point. 
Shared ongoing revenue. Income dependent on fees and commissions relative to work performed. 
Shared risks and benefits to both parties. All risk is carried by the licensee. 
-No capital outlay for fit-out or stock. 
-Fully equipped outlet with stock 
provided on consignment 
-Franchisee only pays running costs and 
rights fee to Aus Post. 
Licensee pays fees for all start up and any 
maintenance. 
Fig 24. (Post, 2012 b; 2012 d) 
There are many differences between a Licensed Post Office and a franchised 
office (see Figure 24).  An LPO manager is responsible for the comprehensive 
training of all staff (Post, 2012 d).  Conversely a franchisee is provided will all training 
before the agreement is started and receives on-going professional training and 
support from Australia Post over its ten year term (Post, 2012 b).   
A franchisee does not carry the financial burden or risk alone, and the 
manager need only pay base operating costs including labour and a franchise fee 
(Post, 2012 b). In contrast, LPO managers carry the entire burden of risk, cost of 
stock, labour, training, and on-going maintenance of the business (Post, 2012 d).  
Licensed Post Offices have a lower level of support to franchised post outlets and 
may show less compliance with anti-money laundering regulations in comparison to 
their franchised counterparts.  However, an LPO is less controlled, easier to access, 
and has a much greater potential income, with less recurring fees (Post, 2012 b; 
2012 d). This explains the influencing factors which have led to a larger LPO share 
of Australia Post offices at 2,934 compared to only 29 franchise stores (ibid).  
5.4.2 A High Risk Combination: Australia Post and Western Union 
The results reveal that 70.6% of licensed postal staff, and 66% of franchised 
Australia Post staff, expressed a willingness to accept student identification for an 
international transfer (see Figure 25). The comparatively high rate of non-compliance 
in franchised offices highlights an issue beyond the commercial structure of Australia 
Post outlets. Where the literature and data indicates a more developed training 
culture for franchised post offices, the small difference between franchised and 
licensed post offices suggests that ongoing training alone is an insufficient 
explanation for high levels of identification systems decay.  
Smith, T.J.O. 10105152  Honours Thesis  Page 62 
 








Primary Photo I.D. 29.4% 33.3% 
Student I.D. 70.6% 66.6% 
No I.D. 0 0 
Total 34 % 12% 
  
Almost all Australia Post outlets (3,200) are Western Union remittance 
providers (Post, 2012 c). As at 2012, approximately 2.4 million identification checks 
have been processed through Australia Post retail outlets (Post, 2012 a). Given that 
so many outlets are registered remitters, and so many identification checks have 
taken place, it may be that authorities assume that the Western Union services in 
these stores are at low risk of exploitation.  Furthermore post offices are significantly 
exposed to the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth barriers to compliance (Limitation of 
Knowledge and Understanding, Limited Time/Money and Resources, Commercial 
Imperative, and Informal Environment). This exposure is partially due to the 
significant number of services these stores provide.  Australia post employees are 
required to understand the correct procedure for over 100 different services, as well 
as ensuring compliance to AML/CTF obligations in the operation of their Western 
Union transfer service.  The knowledge and understanding required to effectively 
provide Australia Post services represents substantial regulatory commitment. When 
the added AML/CTF requirements for WU transfers are taken into account this 
obligation implies a greater sense of responsibility. 
In conclusion, the threat of money laundering through the Western Union 
systems attached to Australia Post Offices is high, with over 70% of LPO’s and 66% 
of franchise staff expressing a willingness to accept student identification.  The lack 
of compliance in Australia Post offices is likely due to four factors.  These factors are;  
a. Poor staff training standards (Barriers 2 & 4). 
b. Limited knowledge and understanding (Barrier 2). 
c. Prioritisation of commercial imperative (Barrier 5). 
d. Informal environment (Barrier 8). 
The results of this research show that the profit and accessibility focussed design 
applied to the LPO system has bred a significant trend of AML/CTF non-compliance.  
However the seemingly strong framework of the franchised model has not precluded 
those stores from non-compliance.  This is true in spite of the comprehensive and 
ongoing training provided by Australia Post.  This highlights the fact that both 
franchised and licensed postal stores have substantial issues with training and 
education on anti-money laundering regulatory compliance.  The large number of 
individual financial services and transactional products distract staff and employees 
away from each store’s regulatory obligations. 
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5.4.3 Independent Shop-front Remitters 
Independent remitters made up a significant portion of the phase two data set 
at 38% (see Figure 26).  The data set includes results from agencies fitting the Semi-
formal, excepting PayPal, and Covert Non-aligned categories outlined in Figure 26.  
The majority of inquiries were made to Semi-formal ARS agencies and three were 
made to Covert Non-aligned remittance services.  The covert remittance businesses 
were operating out of ethnically focussed stores, which were a butchers shop, video 
store, and restaurant. 
Figure 26. Remittance Categories and Characteristics 
Remittance Service Categories Remittance Characteristics and  Brand Examples 
Semi-formal  
 Transfers may be secondary to main business. 
 Transfers to many different countries. 
 Provides online services. 
 Operates out of a shop front. 
 Advertises to the public. 
 (i.e. WU, PayPal, MoneyGram, Ez Money Express and 
UAE Exchange). 
Covert Non-aligned  
 Operates out of an unlikely premise (i.e. Taxi, 
Restaurant, Butcher, Ethnic Video Store, and Private 
Residence). 
 Not Brand Affiliated. 
 Relies on word of mouth and familial networks instead 
of advertising. 
 Hawala, Hundi, and Black Market Peso style operations. 
The results highlight a mixed level of non-compliance in the independent 
store-front sector of the ARS community (see Figure 27).  A total of 31.5% of 
independent agents contacted were willing to accept a student identification card, 
and 15.7% of the sample did not require identification to make a transaction.  A slight 
majority of agents (52.6%) required primary photo identification to authorise a 
transfer.  Overall however 47.2% of agents contacted did not require primary photo 
identification and as a result were not compliant with Australia’s AML/CTF legislation.  
Figure 27. Independent Store-front Business Data 
Accepted ID Independent Store-front Business 
Primary Photo I.D. 52.6% 
Student I.D. 31.5% 
No I.D. 15.7% 
Total 38 % 
5.4.4 Business Inquiry Observations 
During a number of the business inquiries significant confusion was displayed 
by many ARS staff with regard to the definition of what is considered valid 
identification.  When making a contact ARS staff would often mention but not specify 
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an identification requirement.  In response the researcher would ask “is student ID 
ok?”, which would generally result in a yes/no response.  However on multiple 
occasions staff would ask in return whether the card had a photo, signature, and an 
expiry date.  An affirmation of these characteristics of a student card was always 
given. This confirms that as long as these features were on the student card, then it 
was accepted.  The confusion expressed by ARS staff further supports the 
significance of the limitation of knowledge and understanding as a persistent barrier 
to compliance.  It also supports the inadequacy of Australia’s anti-money laundering 
regime and its failure to effectively inhibit non-compliance in the ARS sector. 
One business inquiry found that an ARS agency made it a standard operation 
to only sight identification on the first visit to the agency.  After the first visit it was 
explained that “your information will be saved onto our computer and there is no 
need to worry about bringing identification if you come again”.  The agency was also 
willing to take student identification on the first visit.  This practice is illegal (Australia, 
2012), and is easily exploited to launder money.  For example if a customer were to 
supply fake identification and it was not detected, then the ‘once-only’ identification 
check would prevent further scrutiny of the fake identification. 
Independent store front-remitters are still under significant threat of 
exploitation for money laundering, despite extensive regulatory controls (see Figure 
27).  While the compliance level of the independents is better than Australia Post, 
the compartmentalised structure of storefront remitters means that they are more 
likely to be targeted by organised criminals to launder money, in comparison to a 
Post Office.  The detection of three underground remittance services in this data set 
further reinforces difficulties with Australia’s anti-money laundering regime, and the 
need to take alternative steps to improve the cultural insensitivity of regulation in the 
ARS sector.  Alternative remittance businesses which operate independently are the 
most likely to be substantially impacted by the eight barriers to compliance, and as a 
result move their business underground.  
5.4.5 Travel Business: A More Secure ARS Platform 
Travel businesses made up 16% of the total business inquiries data set.  In 
contrast to the other three categories, there is a high level of compliance recorded.  
The remittance businesses contacted to retrieve this data were travel agencies 
which are owned and operated by multinational corporation Flight Centre Limited 
(2011).  The majority of inquiries were made to Flight Centre, however Escape 
Travel, Student Flights, and Travel Money Oz, are affiliates of Flight Centre Limited 
and were also contacted (Limited, 2011).  All of these travel agencies are also 
MoneyGram agents.  This service is provided to facilitate international money 












Student I.D. 10% 
No I.D. 0 
Total 16% 
Travel agencies which provide MoneyGram services (see Figure 28) showed 
high levels of compliance to identification requirements.  Ninety percent of travel 
agencies require primary photo identification to conduct a money transfer, while only 
ten percent were willing to accept student identification.  This trend highlights the 
context in which Australian AML/CTF regulations are effective in the ARS sector.  
The Flight Centre Limited Corporation is a multibillion dollar, multinational 
organisation which has the significant resources to effectively implement and 
maintain systems which ensure AML/CTF compliance (Limited, 2011 c).  Flight 
Centre has professional policies in place to deal with unethical behaviour and 
misconduct in the workplace (Limited, 2011 a), and an ongoing and effective risk 
management policy (Limited, 2011 b).  These are three reasons why this business is 
effective at implementing and maintaining compliance with Australian AML/CTF 
regulations.   
More importantly, the travel industry has other advantages which overshadow 
the eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance faced by alternative remittance agents 
outside this sector.  The key factors which aid the travel sector beyond the significant 
level of resources available to large business are;  
a) Travel agents have a peak representative body called AFTA (2012 a). 
b) The nature of travel is strictly regulated in a way appropriate to the industry 
(AFTA, 2012 b). 
c) The travel industry has a culture of financial backup (AFTA, 2012 b). 
d) Flight centre agencies have only three areas of business (Travel, Insurance, 
and Remittance/Finance services) (Flight Centre, 2012). 
These aspects of the travel industry indicate a higher level of compliance standing 
than Australia’s general ARS sector.  There are very few barriers to achieving and 
maintaining regulatory compliance, whether in the area of travel or AML/CTF 
legislation. 
Regulation of the travel industry is designed specifically for the benefit of 
travel agents and their business (AFTA, 2012 a).  The Australian Federation of 
Travel Agents (AFTA) is a government run representative body which guides best 
practice in the travel sector (AFTA, 2012 b).  Its mission is: “to promote travel and 
tourism and enhance the professionalism and profitability of its members through 
effective representation in industry and government affairs, education and training 
and by identifying and satisfying the needs of the travelling public” (AFTA, 2012).  
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AFTA provides a mechanism to ensure that the positive development of the industry 
is a key focus alongside government initiatives which shape regulatory measures.  
AFTA also highlights the importance of improving the professionalism and 
profitability of its members through the development and provision of certified 
education and training (AFTA, 2012 a).  The benefits of a peak body which develops 
and implements regulations should not be understated. 
Another advantage held by the travel industry over the general ARS sector is 
its established culture of financial backup (AFTA, 2012 b).  The travel industry 
representative body AFTA trains and certifies travel agents to consult their 
customers on the importance and benefits of travel insurance, as an effective risk 
management tool for industry (ibid).  This is an effective way of protecting the 
industry’s customers, which in turn maintains consumer confidence in international 
travel.  Without that confidence the profitability of the travel industries commercial 
imperative will decline.  This use of financial risk management explains in part the 
value of Flight Centre’s approach to AML/CTF requirements. 
Flight Centre travel agencies also benefit due to the limited number of 
services provided in each store (Flight Centre, 2012).  Unlike the general population 
of store-front ARS agents and staff, Flight Centre employees only need to attend to 
three primary services; travel, insurance, and remittance/currency exchange services 
(ibid).  With less products and services surrounding an ARS transfer service, 
AML/CTF compliance is less likely to be diluted by other aspects of an ARS 
business.  This also allows for additional education and training for staff on 
regulatory requirements, decreasing the risk of exploitation for money laundering. 
In conclusion, the results gathered from travel agencies highlights the need 
for regulatory improvement.  These results also cast a shadow over ARS regulations 
that inhibit compliance rather than promoting it.  With the improvements to the travel 
sector facilitated by AFTA, the question remains as to why Australia’s ARS sector 
lacks cohesive industry representation. Australia’s ARS sector struggles under 
culturally and contextually insensitive regulations.  The ARS industry would benefit 
from official representation by a professional association.  Without such a body, the 
ARS sector is likely to continue to weaken Australia’s national security framework. 
5.4.6 Overall Result of Business Inquiries 
The results from the complete data set on business inquiries show the state of 
legislative adherence in Australian ARS agencies (see Figure 29).  From a total of 50 
business inquiries, 46% of ARS agencies were willing to accept student identification 
as validation for a substantial international transaction, while 6% did not require any 
identification at all.  In contrast 48% of ARS agencies were unwilling to take student 
identification, instead indicating that only primary photo identification was acceptable.  
These results indicate that strict AML/CTF regulation of the ARS sector has failed to 




Figure 29. Overall State of Legislative Adherence. 
Accepted ID Total 
Primary Photo 
I.D. 48% 
Student I.D. 46% 
No I.D. 6% 
Total n=50 
The high level of non-compliance in the phase two inquiries resonate with the 
eight barriers to AML/CTF compliance (see Figure 29).  These barriers indicate 
design flaws in the regulatory framework applied to the Australian ARS sector.  This 
refers to the fact that Australia’s regulatory framework is based on international 
standards instead of social and cultural factors, along with consultation with the ARS 
sector.  Therefore with over half of participants demonstrating non-compliance with 
regulated identification requirements, the weakness evident in Australia’s ARS 
community represents a serious threat to national security. The Australian remittance 
community’s regulatory practices show the impact of ineffective international 
AML/CTF standards (Passas, 2006).  From the conclusion on Australia’s first and 
only mutual evaluation in 2005, followed by the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Australia, 2012), 
Australia’s anti-money laundering regime has advanced by gradually imposing costly 
and demanding regulations on the ARS sector (AUSTRAC, 2007; 2008 c; 2009; 
2010; 2011 h).   
This ‘enforcement’ style of regulation moves the eight significant barriers to 
compliance into the foreground of this discussion.  Substantial barriers to compliance 
include the limitation of understanding and knowledge which prevents the effective 
training of ARS staff on compliance requirements. Other factors include the 
prioritisation of commercial imperative over compliance processes, a lack of 
resources, and the allure of large profits.  This allows ARS agents to facilitate highly 
profitable criminal activity in the face of complex and costly regulatory measures.  
These barriers also stand as influential motivators for ARS agents to avoid regulatory 
measures, and to consider moving their transfer service underground.  
Australia should look to social and culturally derived community consultation 
for a solution.  In examining the level of compliance in Flight Centre travel agencies 
(which provide MoneyGram transfer services), the regulation of Australia’s ARS 
sector appears to benefit from the travel industry’s model.  The travel industry gains 
advantage from industry representation through AFTA.  AFTA is an association 
which develops best practice policy for the travel sector, in the interest of the industry 
as a whole (AFTA, 2012 a).  In a similar sense, the creation of a peak body to 
represent members of the ARS community in the industry and government affairs 
would provide a mechanism for reducing the informal approach to compliance within 
the ARS industry.  The peak body could also be in a position to develop ongoing 
training and educational programs, eventually leading up to the creation of industry 
certification standards for ARS agents.   
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5.5 PHASE THREE: INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Phase three of data collection involved six international transfers in three sets.  
The first set of transfers sent money from Australia to Kenya, then from Kenya to 
Dubai, then from Dubai back to Australia.  The second transfer was a single 
transaction and with receipt in Zimbabwe.  The third set of transfers was made to 
and from Pakistan.  Specific details about remittance agents have been removed/ 
redacted for privacy reasons and in order to satisfy the ethics requirements 
underpinning the collection of this data.   
5.5.2 International Transfers First Set  
Figure 30. First Set: International Transfer and Receipt One 
 
Transfer: 
The first international transaction made to Kenya was through a remittance 
agency in Victoria Park, Perth W.A (see Figure 30).  This agency will only do 
business with customers identified through a familial network of customers.  As such 
this requires that a friend or family member supply the remittance agent with one’s 
personal details before the existence of the transfer service will be acknowledged by 
staff.  The informal remittance agency also doubles as a Food Wholesale business.  
The transaction amount was AUD $200, which incurred a fee of AUD $10, at the 
exchange rate of 1:1.  No identification was required to make the transfer, and the 





Receipt of the converted US $190 occurred a day later in Bondeni, Mombasa 
in Kenya.  The receipt of these funds was made in a retail perfume store and the 
recipient was informed of the waiting transaction via text message.  Although no 
identification was required to receive the funds, a name and phone number were 
collected and recorded at the time of pick-up (see Figure 30). 




From Mombasa, US $180 was transferred on to Dubai on the same day as 
the receipt of the funds from Australia (see Figure 31).  The transfer cost a flat USD 
$10 fee and was converted to Arab Emirates Dirham’s (AED), at the exchange rate 
of 3.7:1.  No receipt was given for the transaction and no identification was required.  
It is noted that the transfer might possibly take an extra day due to closed trading for 
some stores on Saturdays in Dubai.  The normal speed of the transfer is instant. 
Receipt:  
The next day the funds were received in a suburb called Deira in Dubai, to the 
sum of AED 666.  The ARS agency through which the funds arrived was a Money 
Exchange Dealer. No primary photo identification was required to receive the funds; 
however the agent did sight the student identification of the receiver, and make a 
record of their name and mobile number.  A text message was sent to notify the 





Figure 32. First Set: International Transfer and Receipt Three 
 
Transfer: 
The final transfer of AUD $170, revealed a total of $30 in transfer fees had 
been accrued (see Figure 32).  The exchange rate returning to Australia was 3.7:1, 
which is the same rate which was applied from Mombasa to Dubai. Again, no 
identification was required to make the transfer and no receipt was provided. 
Receipt:  
When the funds were received in Australia from Dubai, the same food 
wholesaler in Victoria Park provided access to the funds (see Figure 32).  A text 
message was used to inform the receiver and a total of AUD $170 was received.  
However in contrast to the original outgoing transfer made to Kenya, the remittance 
agent required full primary photo identification from the receiver, which was provided 
in the form of a passport.  The ARS agent recorded the address, full name, date of 
birth, date of issue on the passport, and the expiry date. 
5.5.3 First Set: International Transactions Observations 
Common characteristics across this set of international transfers are; a lack of 
identification, no receipts given for transferring or receiving funds, a flat fee no matter 
the destination, and low level recording of receivers details generally without sighting 
identification.  From the first transfer through to the last, Dubai to Australia, the ARS 
agencies carried out transactions without sighting any form of identification.  One 
agent sighted a student identification card, and others made a note of receivers 
name and mobile number expressing significant trust in their customers.   
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When funds were received into Australia from Dubai, the ARS agent set a 
different standard of identification requirements.  This jump from no identification 
standard to the very highest possible is different to the other transfers.  The transfer 
agent in Dubai was not concerned about the customer sending funds into Australia.  
Outgoing transactions from Australia appear to present little concern for the food 
wholesaler in Victoria Park.  Yet an international transfer made out of Australia with 
no identification is just as illegal as remittances flowing in which have not been 
validated through details recorded from primary photo identification (Australia, 2012).   
5.5.4 Second Transfer: Individual International Transfers to Zimbabwe 
Figure 33 shows the transfer of money to Zimbabwe.  This ticked boxes show 
as black boxes over the appropriate answer. As with other transfers there are 
several parts of each form which have been left blank by the remittance provider, 
indicating a less exacting approach to the recording of transfer details. 
Figure 33. Second Set: International Transfer to Zimbabwe (Redacted) 
 
Transfer: 
A single transfer of AUD$300 was sent to Zimbabwe via an ARS agency in 
Nollamara, Perth W.A (see Figure 33).  The transfer fee was $15 and the exchange 
rate was 1:1.  The transfer was instant and primary photo identification was required 
to make the transaction.  Details recorded by ARS staff include the passport number, 




Figure 34. Second Set: Receipt in Zimbabwe 
 
Receipt: 
 The money arrived in Harare, Zimbabwe the next day.  A text message was 
used to alert the owner of funds ready to be picked up (see Figure 34).  A total of 
USD $300 was delivered and primary photo identification was required at pick-up.  A 
national Identity card was used to as valid identification.  Unfortunately, the money 
could not return via informal funds transfer to Australia.  This is because the only 
money transfers allowed out of Zimbabwe are formalised banking transfers such as 




5.5.6 Third Set: To and From Pakistan 
Figure 35. Third Set: Australia to Pakistan (Redacted) 
 
Transfer Only:  
The first transfer to Pakistan was made through a money transfer business in 
Victoria Park, Perth Western Australia (see Figure 35).  A total of AUD $620.00 was 
sent using a Western Union gold card along with an Australian Divers License.  The 
gold card allows customers to streamline their transfer time by recording details of 
repeat recipients reducing the amount of detail required to be written out on each 
transfer sheet (Western Union, 2012).  In addition, the service is free, is capable of 
storing a large number of recipients details, and holds the customers personal details 
as sighted from their identification when signing up for the membership (ibid).  The 
transfer cost AUD $15.00 and a three dollar fee was charged for a message to be 
sent with the transfer.  The exchange rate at the transfer agency was 96.6:1 and the 
payout in Pakistan Rupee (Rp) was 58,159.68.  The receipt included complete 
details of the customer’s identification details, the name of the intended recipient, as 
well as terms conditions of the transfer concerning exchange rate and other topics.  
The receipt was signed by the agent but not by the customer, and has a section for 
test questions and noting whether the receiver will have valid identification.  The test 
section was not filled out except for a ‘Yes’ indication on the valid identification of the 




Figure 36. Third Set: Pakistan to Australia (Redacted) 
 
Transfer Only:  
 The second transfer was made in a money transfer agency two days after the 
first transfer (Figure 36).  The transaction came to the total of 2,600 Rp which 
converted to AUD $19.89 at the rate of 0.0099437:1.  The transfer cost 600Rp and 
was validated by National Identification Card details which, according to the 
international volunteers’ remarks, was not taken by sighting the card instead the 
number and expiry date was given to the agent verbally.  The key detail of the 
receipt were the name and address of the sender, a consignment number (MTCN), 
operator identification number, and the receivers name.  This receipt has a question 
as to whether the receiver will have valid identification which was marked as ‘Yes’.  
There was no test question section on the receipt.  The same terms and conditions 
are marked on the receipt indicating that the agent is part of the Western Union 




5.5.7 Third Set: To and From Pakistan Observations 
Customer details required on the ‘Australian to Pakistan’ Western Union form 
were far-reaching in comparison to the returning ‘Pakistan to Australia’ form.  The 
‘Australia to Pakistan’ receipt required all information from a driver’s license or a 
passport.  This includes detail on the date of issue, expiry and date of birth, country 
of birth, occupation, and purpose of the transfer.  In contrast, the receipt for the 
Pakistan to Australia transfer only had headings for identification type and unique 
number and the expiry date.  This highlights a disparity between Australia and 
Pakistan with customer authentication.   
The use of a Western Union Gold Card (which is designed to streamline the 
transfer process) is a mechanism which could lead to non-compliance in standard 
procedure.  The level of customer detail held on a gold card provides an easy way to 
process a transaction quickly without sighting valid identification.  This system 
reinforces the practice of prioritising a commercial advantage (i.e. the speed and 
ease of transfers). This practice also illustrates leanings towards familial and trust-
based practices in money transfers. 
As a holder of a Western Union Gold Card, any customer can process an 
international money transfer without the need to show identification. The Gold card 
automatically generates pre-existing identification information. It would be easy for a 
family member or friend to use a Gold Card, allow the remittance agent to process a 
transfer, and complete the transaction without the need to validate the identification 
details. This vulnerability exists even though the presenter of the card might not have 
been the person whose identification details have been used from the Gold Card. 
Western Union has developed this system of remittance process in order to attract 
more clients who have a closer predilection towards familial and trust-based 
networks. Familial and Trust networks can hinder regulatory compliance with 
identification requirements.   
Failure to sight identification in the process of the second transfer indicates 
the persistence of informality in the remittance agency.  In this case, details on valid 
identification are presented as if sighted when it was not.  The remitter’s actions in 
asking for valid identification details without checking them is an example of how 
informality persists despite a formal transfer and recording process.  In both 
transactions agents signed the receipt in order to validate the transfer process.  
However in both cases the customer did not sign the receipt leaving it blank.  This 
indicates a less rigorous approach to the recording of transfer details in both 
transactions. 
5.6 PHASE THREE CONCLUSIONS 
The phase three data results highlight trends in international money transfers.  
The first set of transfers show a very low level of customer identification.  Transfers 
are usually conducted with no identification requirements at all, whereas upon 
receiving funds an ARS agent will usually make a record of the receivers name and 
phone number.  Outgoing customer identification standards across the international 
transactions were extremely low.   
When money was transferred back into Australia from Dubai the identification 
requirement increased.  The same informal remittance agent who had facilitated an 
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anonymous transfer to Kenya required a primary photo identification check for 
receiving funds just a few days later.  This is significant because facilitating an 
anonymous transaction out of Australia is just as unlawful as receiving and 
distributing anonymous funds into Australia.  The disparity between other 
transactions where identification requirements have been non-existent, and the very 
last receipt of funds indicates an inconsistency in compliance with AML/CTF 
regulations. 
The Pakistan transfers show an inconsistency in customer identification 
requisites between nations. The ‘Australia to Pakistan’ Western Union receipt 
recorded extensive customer detail whereas the return transfer from Pakistan did 
not.  The Western Union Gold Card is a mechanism designed to streamline the 
transfer process. Gold Cards can sidestep identification authentication. Transfers 
from Pakistan to Australia tend to be more informal. This is illustrated by the formal 
recording and transfer process expected on the receipt, yet undermined by the 
agents’ verbal verification of the National Identity number and expiry date.  The 
validation ignores the required identification process yet is passed off as sighted and 
verified by the remittance agent. Such an action cannot be distinguished due to the 
lack of detail required by the form.  In addition, both receipts were signed by the 
transfer agent but not by the customer despite the legal requirements to the contrary. 
In conclusion, the results extracted from the data indicate the informal nature 
of traditional systems in international alternative remittances.  There was a lack of 
customer identification across the entirety of the first set of transfers, with the 
exception of the last receipt of funds into Australia.  There is an inconsistency 
between information from different transfer origins, as well as the use of Western 
Union Gold Cards, which promote non-compliance through operational streamlining.  
The transfer agency in Pakistan also demonstrated a reliance on unclear transfer 
record sheets, and the practice of only partially filling in remittance forms.  These 
results substantiate the conclusion that regulatory inadequacies may extend beyond 
international borders, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send 




CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are inconsistencies in the adherence to AML/CTF legislation between 
remittance agencies in Australia. This thesis hypothesised that informal remittance 
agents (in particular those providing alternate remittance systems) would be 
prepared to ignore or avoid some of the identification requirements for an 
international money transfer. 
A trend towards loose regulatory control, characterised by a lack of cultural 
awareness, and informal regulatory practices, has increased the risk of criminal 
exploitation.  There is widespread partial obscurity of the identification of persons 
engaged in sending and receiving money across international borders.  The primary 
outcomes of this research have found that money transfer agencies face eight 
significant barriers to compliance with Australia’s anti-money laundering regulations.  
Analysis of data collection results found that over half of remittance staff in 
one sample exhibited non-compliance with identification requirements under anti-
money laundering regulations.  Furthermore, analysis of a separate data set 
revealed an overall lack of customer identification requirements in money transfer 
processes, which extend beyond national borders.  This chapter explains the 
implementation and limitations of this study, looks at future research, and answers 
the secondary and principal outcomes of this study.  Recommendations are provided 
based on the outcomes of the research. 
6.2 IMPLEMENTATION AND LIMITATIONS  
Overall, the design and implementation of this research project developed 
well with few complications.  The project was referred to a higher level of ethical 
clearance in order to satisfy aspects of deception within the study, specifically the 
transfer of money with the expectation that remittance agents would ignore 
identification compliance.  This was due to the testing of legislative compliance as if 
the researcher was a customer for data collection, and the possibility of exposing 
criminal activity as a result.   
Ethical clearance was obtained under the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct of Human Research (Government, 2007 a). Data collection involved 
relatively small sets of transactional information owing to limitations in terms of the 
location and identification of suitable informal remittance agencies. Further 
limitations included the need for sizeable monetary outlay (more than $300) on the 
part of the researcher to complete a set of international money transfers. 
Subsequently there was a limited sample size of the phase three data set.  A larger 
sample was obtained for the phase two data set with 88 initial remittance samples 
reducing to a phase two sample of 50 remittance agencies.  The limitation of external 
validity is also applicable to this research project, thus further research in this area of 





6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Australia’s alternative remittance sector is comparatively open to greater 
exploitation than the formal banking sector.  The sector is characterised by a set of 
barriers and limitations that drive many of its industry stakeholders to resort to 
reduced compliance with identity regulations. It suffers from a lack of 
professionalism, certification, and industry representation.  A future research project 
may seek to test the viability of peak body representation as a mechanism for 
professional development, and appropriate regulation in the alternative remittance 
sector.   
6.4 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
6.4.1 Supporting Research Question 
What are the significant barriers to legislative adherence in ARS? 
The results of the phase one literature review highlight eight barriers to 
compliance in Australia’s alternative remittance industry.  These barriers are detailed 
in order of significance; 
1. Culturally Insensitive Regulatory Measures 
2. Limitation of Knowledge and Understanding 
3. Allure of Large Profits 
4. Time, Money and the Lack of Resources 
5. Prioritisation of Commercial Imperative 
6. Trust and Familial Networks 
7. Informal Legacy 
8. Informal Environment 
These eight barriers are influenced by the impact of the first barrier; Culturally 
Insensitive Regulatory Measures.  The second, fourth, and fifth barriers are 
influenced by Australia’s overly prescriptive anti-money laundering regulations.  The 
remaining barriers are amplified by cultural factors.  The significance of all eight 
barriers lies in their aggregated impact, resulting in a culture of regulatory 
compliance.  
A number of other key issues underline the existence of barriers to AML/CTF 
compliance, especially with regard to customer identification.  Money transfer agents 
face a significant barrier in terms of their limited understanding of what is necessary 
to achieve compliance under Australian law.  In addition the money transfer sector is 
at a disadvantage from bureaucratic and criminal expectations, with the allure of 
criminal profits made more significant by overbearing and uninformed regulations.   
Alternative remittance agencies lack the necessary resources to achieve 
compliance under AML/CTF regulations. As such the allure of unregulated operation 
is amplified, and this represents a significant threat to Australia’s national security. A 
money transfer agent’s commercial needs can overshadow the need for compliance, 
particularly where the sale of primary services is likely to take priority over the 
practice of sighting, verifying and authenticating identification.   
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Customer trust relationships were informal, and in such instances familiarity 
between agent and customer became relaxed.  The opportunity to side-step 
regulatory control was also highlighted. As well as the fact that the informal 
environment of remittance agencies challenges AML/CTF compliance through a 
shared focus on unrelated sales and services. 
In conclusion, the result derived from the review of the literatures found that 
the first barrier to compliance is the most influential of all eight barriers.  This is 
predominantly because the AML/CTF regulations imposed on remittance agencies 
are derived from a ‘Western’ perspective. Traditional Western banking systems are 
not sensitive to the cultural factors which explain the persistent trend of reliance on 
informal systems. They view informal transfers as less valuable than certified bank 
transfers and telegraphic transfers. Therefore affecting change in the design of 
regulation imposed on Australia’s alternative remittance sector is the key to inhibiting 
the influence of the eight barriers on the state of compliance in the money transfer 
industry.  
6.4.2 Principal Research Question 
To what extent are alternative remittance agencies upholding customer 
identification standards when transferring and receiving funds? 
The data collected from fifty (n=50) alternative remittance agencies highlights 
a 52% state of non-compliance with customer identification standards.  A total of 
46% of remittance agencies were willing to accept student identification, and a 
further 6% did not require identification to make a transaction.  The other data set 
showed a lack of customer identification in international money transfer agencies. 
This data set also highlights the persistence of informality and irregularity in systems 
which have formalised recording and transfer processes, and the use of mechanisms 
which promote non-compliance (the Western Union Gold Card).  The sample of 
international transactions also highlighted the non-conforming manner that informal 
transfer services operate.  These results infer that regulatory inadequacies may 
extend beyond the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send 
untraceable money to and from Australia.   
The threat of money laundering through the Western Union systems attached 
to Australia Post outlets is high.  Over 70% of Licensed Post Offices and 66% of 
franchise staff expressed a willingness to accept student identification in lieu of a 
primary identification document (i.e.: Passport, drivers licence).  A total of 31.5% of 
independent agents were willing to accept student identification, and 15.7% of the 
sample did not require identification to make a transaction.  In contrast the 90% state 
of compliance, in flight centre affiliated travel agencies, supports the assertion that 
Australia's travel industry benefits from characteristics which make compliance with 








The results of this study address the issue of whether the internationally 
recommended approach to regulating alternative remittance industries is a valid one. 
In conducting this research, a significant trend of non-compliance with identification 
requirements set out in Australian legislation was identified.  In order to respond to 
this security threat the following recommendations are put forward for AUSTRAC 
and the community of wider stakeholder’s benefit: 
a) The structure of remittance regulation needs to be revisited. 
i. Any attempt to review Australia's AML/CTF regulations on the alternative 
remittance sector should be conducted in consultation with the alternative 
remittance community.  
b) There is a need to address the lack of training and educational resources 
available to non-finance based Regulated Entities. 
c) Address the lack of representation by a Peak Body in Australia’s ARS 
industry. 
i. An investigation should be conducted into the viability of developing a 
peak body to represent members of the ARS community in industry. 
d) AUSTRAC should recognise the need to treat enterprise in the non-core 
remittance industry differently to business in which finance is the core 
function.  
Failure to address these issues will result in a persistent increase of high risk un-
regulated remittance activity, and criminal exploitation in Australia’s ARS sector. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The mainstream state of non-compliance in Australia’s alternative remittance 
community infers a low level of effectiveness in the anti-money laundering system.  
This implication represents a state of weakness in Australia’s national security 
framework.  From the conclusion of Australia’s last mutual evaluation in 2005, 
followed by the AML/CTF Act 2006, Australia’s anti-money laundering system has 
advanced by gradually imposing costly and increasingly demanding regulations on 
the remittance sector.  This ‘enforcement’ style of regulation has led to the 
prominence of eight significant barriers to compliance.  The most significant of these 
eight barriers are;  
1. Culturally Inappropriate Regulatory Measures, which refers to the design of 
Australia’s anti-money laundering system which is based on international 
standards instead of socio-cultural factors, and consultation with the ARS 
sector. 
2. The limitation of understanding and knowledge, which limits effective training 
of agency staff and the accurate application of risk management.  
3. The prioritisation of commercial imperative over compliance processes; or the 
likelihood that the effective sale of primary services will take precedence over 
Australia’s highly complex and costly regulations. 
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4. The allure of large profits, which refers to the increased appeal of highly 
profitable criminal activity when faced with highly complex and costly 
regulations. 
These barriers stand as influential motivators for ARS agents to avoid regulatory 
measures, or move their transfer service underground.  Moreover, these barriers are 
amplified by the negative impact of the first and most significant barrier; Culturally 
Insensitive Regulatory Measures.  Therefore changes need to be made to Australia’s 
AML/CTF regulatory system using an awareness of the underlying social and cultural 
factors which resonate with the persistence of alternative remittance custom.   
 The level of non-compliance displayed by employees in the two post office 
categories contacted is likely due to; the limited knowledge and understanding 
provided to staff in the form of training with regard to Western Union services.  The 
other likely reasons for the high level of non-compliance are the prioritisation of each 
stores commercial imperative, and the informal environment within Australia Post 
outlets.  This is evident because Australia Post outlets are licensed to provide over 
100 different services, including the facilitation of passport and other official 
identification applications.  As a result anti-money laundering compliance is inhibited 
by the distraction of many other services surrounding the Western Union transfer 
system. 
The data on independent remitters highlights mixed results on legislative 
compliance.  While the compliance level in this category was higher than Australia 
Post, independent remitters remain at high risk of exploitation.  This is due to the 
compartmentalised nature of the independent remittance sector of the ARS industry. 
The data gathered from travel agencies provides a valid example of the 
improvements that could be made to the regulation of the alternative remittance 
sector.  The advantages granted to the travel sector are the result of representation 
by the peak body AFTA. The ARS industry would benefit from official representation 
by a peak body like that of AFTA.  Without such a body, the ARS sector is likely to 
continue to decline into an even less compliant sector and undermine Australia’s 
national security framework. 
The results extracted from international transactions highlight the nature of 
traditional operation in alternative remittance.  There was a lack of customer 
identification across the first set of transfers, with the exception of the last receipt of 
funds into Australia.  There is inconsistency of information between transfer origins, 
and the use of Western Union Gold Cards, which promote non-compliance through 
operational streamlining. Transfer agents also used unclear transfer record sheets, 
and incomplete record keeping with partially filled transaction forms. The level of 
detail withheld across the sample of international transactions showed non-
conformity to the recording of customer details in alternative remittances.  These 
results conclude that regulatory inadequacies extend both domestically and beyond 
the border, to alternative and informal systems which regularly send untraceable 
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Appendix (C). Community Newspapers Accessed to Find Local ARS Agents 
Community Newspapers Reference 
Indian Link  Edition: April 2012 Vol.2 No.11 
Oriental Post Edition: 01/06/2012 ISSN: 1447-9176 
Australia Asia Business Weekly Edition: 07/06/2012 ISSN: 1836-1234 
Oriental Leisure & Living Edition: 08/06/2012 ISSN: 1447-9176 
Australian Migration Times Edition: 25/05/2012 Vol. 77 
Australian Chinese Times Edition: 13/06/2012 ISSN: 710 
The Epoch Times Perth Edition Edition: 09/06/2012 ISSN: 1839-0676 
 
